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FEDERAL TAXATION,

1941-1947

SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF
FEDERAL TAXATION, 1941-1947: II*
Paul G. Kaupert

II
TOP I CAL SURVEY

C. Federal Income Taxes
112
2. Taxes on Corporate Income
(a) The basic (normal and surtax) rate structure (I.R.C., §§ 13,
14 and 15). The 1941 Revenue Act carried forward the rather complex normal tax structure prescribed by the 1940 Revenue Act and in

*

The first installment of this article appeared in the April, I 947 issue at p.
659. The following outline indicates the sequence of material under ToPICAL SURVEY
in this and the preceding installment:
A. The Federal Estate Tax
I. The Rate Structure
2. Gross Estate Inclusions
3. Deductions and Credits
4. Burden of the Tax
B. The Federal Gift Tax
1. The Rate Structure
2. Taxable Transfers
3. Exclusions from Value-Exceptions
C. Federal Income Taxes
1. Taxes on Income of Individuals
(a) The rate structure
(b) Withholding and collection of tax at the source
(c) Declaration and payment of estimated tax
( d) Tax simplification
2. Taxes on Corporate Income
(a) The basic (normal and surtax) rate structure
(b) The excess profits tax
3. Gross Income-Inclusions and Exclusions
4. Deductions
5. Accounting
6. Sales and Exchanges
7. Corporate Distributions and· Reorganizations
8. Taxable Persons
(a) Corporations
(b) Husband-wife
(c) Trusts
D. The Roie of the United States Tax Court.
Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
112 No referen~e is made in the text to the surtax imposed under I.R.C., § I02
on corporations improperly accumulating surplus. This section was not substantially

t
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addition introduced a corporate surtax rate schedule. The normal tax
rates were increased to absorb the ro% defense tax previously imposed as a separate tax and also a very slight increase in the rates
applicable to -corporations with a normal-tax net income of less than
$38,46r.54. As so altered the normal tax amounted to 24% in the
case of corporations having normal-tax net income over $38,46r.54,
and· in the case of corporations having no more than this amount of
normal-tax net income the applicable rate was determined by use of a
bracket system that ranged from 15% on :the first $5,000 to 37% on
the excess over $25,000.113 The new' surtax imposed by the 1941
act 114 was levied at the rate of 6% on the first ,$25,000 of surtax net
income and 7% on the remainder.
The basic scheme
of the normal tax as well as the new surtax was
I
carried forward by the 1942 Revenue Act. However, the dividing
line for normal tax purposes was changed from $38,46r.54 to $50,000
and the highest bracket rate on corporations having a normal-tax net
income in excess of $50,000 was reduced to 3r%.115 Otherwise the
normal tax rates were- not disturbed. Surtax rates were increased so as
to range from 10% upon surtax net income not over $25,000 to 16%
upon the surtax net income of corporations having such income over
- $50,000.116 Under this act the maximum aggregate normal and surtax was 40%, as contrasted with 31% under the preceding law.
No further changes were made in the basic corporate tax structure
until the Revenue Act of 1945 reduced the surtax rates. Under this
changed during the period under review. For a recent decision sustaining the Board
-of Tax Appeals in its determination of a d~fi.ciency based on this section see
Helvering v. Chicago Stock Y_ards Company, 318 U.S. 693, 63 S. Ct. 843 (1943).
On the subject generally, see Holzman, "Impact of the War's End on Section 102,"
24 TAXES 24 (1946).
On the taxation of personal holding companies under § 500 of the code, see
Rudick, "Section 102 and Personal Holding Company Provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code," 49 YALE L. J. 171 (1939); Halperin, "Personal Holding Company
Income," 23 TAXES 532 (1945); Winsten, ''Personal Holding Company Income," 23
TAXES 701 (1945).
Several-changes were made during the period under review in the rates applicable
to the capital stock and declared-value excess profits taxes. Both taxes were eliminated'
from the code by the Revenue Act of 1945 (§§ 201 and 202). It is not recorded
that their interment occasioned any grief.
118
Revenue Act of 1941, §' 103(a) and (b), amending I.R.C., §§ 13(b}(1)
and (2) and 14(b).
iu Sec. 104(a), amending I.R.C., § 15.
115 Revenue Act of 1942, § 105(a), amending I.R.C., § 13(a)(2) and (b)(2).
116 Revenue Act of 1942, § 105(b), amending I.R.C., § 15.
l
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act111 the surtax rates now range from 6% upon surtax net income
not over $25,000 to I4% upon the surtax net income of corporations
having such income in excess of $50,000. The maximum aggregate
normal and surtax is now 3 8 % as contrasted with 3 I % under the
I94I act and 40% under the I942 act.
(b) The excess profits tax. The stimulation of industrial enterprise that resulted from the government's demand for production of
war materiel as part of its program for strengthening the country's
military position led to a demand for special taxation of "war profits"
even before the United States entered the war. The Excess Profits Tax
of World War II appeared in its embryonic form in the Second Revenue
Act of I940 118 which by its Title II added subchapter E,119 officially
designated as the "Excess Profits Tax Act of I940," to chapter 2 of
the Internal Revenue Code. This legislation was the product of hasty
action, and it was generally recognized at the time that further legislation· would be required to remedy its inadequacies. The legislation
known as the "Excess Profits Tax Amendments of I94I" 120 resulted
in some clarifying changes. Even more substantial alterations were incorporated in Title II of the subsequently enacted Revenue Act of
I94I. However, it was reserved for the Revenue Act of I942 in its
Title II, to give the excess profits tax law its definitive forni. 121
The law in its earlier versions featured a progressively graduated
rate schedule. Under the Second Revenue Act of I940 122 the rates
ranged from 25% on the first $20,000 of adjusted excess profits net
income to 50% on such income in excess of $500,000. The Revenue
Act of I94I 128 stepped up the rates from a minimum of 35% to a
maximum of 60%. The progressively graduated rate feature was
•117 Sec. 12 I

(a), amending I.R.C., § I 5(b).
Act of Oct. 8, 1940, 54 Stat. L. 974, c. 757.
119
Comprising I.R.C., §§ 710 through 752.
120
Act of March 7, 1941, 55 Stat. L. 17, c. IO.
121 The code sections that will be referred to in connection with the discussion
of the excess profits tax law are the sections that were included in subchapter E of
chapter 2 as it stood prior to enactment of the Revenlle Act of 1945 which by its
§ 122(a) repealed° the excess profits tax law with respect to taxable years beginning
after December 31, 1945. Technically the excess profits tax provisions are not included in the current code.
122 Sec. 201, adding to chapter 2 of the code subchapter E, comprising code
§§ 710 through 752. Sec. 710 of the code as thus added imposed the tax and stated
the rate schedule.
128 Sec. 201(a), amending l.R.C., § 710(a).
118
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abandoned in the Revenue Act of 1942 124 which fixed the tax at a flat
rate of 90%. A further change was made in the Revenue Act of
1943 125 which pushed the flat rate up to 9 5 % . The severity of the
flat rate was mitigated by two features of the law first introduced by
the 1942 Revenue Act~ provision was made f~r a post-war refund of
10% of the excess profits tax,126 and an overall 80% rate ceiling was
established with respect to· the combined excess profits tax and the
ordinary normal and surtaxes imposed on corporate income.121
The spe~ific excess profits tax exemption, designed to benefit
small corporations, was originally limited under the 1940 Second Revenue Act 128 to $5,ooo. This was increased to $10,000 by the Revenue
Act of 1943.129 Under the Tax Adjustment Act of 1945,130 the exemption was further increased. to $25,000, effective for· tax years beginning after December 31, 1945 or ending in 1946. In view of the repeal of the excess profits tax by the Revenue Act of 1945, this increase
lost its significance.
··
The excess profits tax law, in the definitive form it attained under
the Revenue .Act of 1942, was a complex piece of legislation. The
most that can be attempted in the course of this review is to indicate
the general pattern of the law and the principal problems engendered
by it.1s1
124

Sec. 202, amending I.R.C., § 71o(a) (i).
Sec. 202, amending I.R.C., § 71o(a) (1)(A).
126 Revenue Act of 1942, § 250, amending subchapter E of chapter 2 of the
code to insert at the end thereof a new Part III, comprising I.R.C., §§ 780 through
783.
'
127 Revenue Act of 1942, § 202, amending I.R.C., § 71o(a)(1).
128 Sec. 201. The exemption clause was found in § 71o(b) (1) of the new
subchapter E of chapter 2 of the code as added by this section of the Second Revenue
Act of 1940.
129 Sec. 204(a), amending I.R.C., §· 710(b)(1).
1130 Sec. 2(a), amending I.R.C., § 710(b)(1).
181 On the general subject see TREAS. REG. l l 2; BREWSTER, THE FEDERAL ExcESs PROFITS TAX (1941); CURRAN, ExcEss PROFITS TAXATION (1943); GILLIM,
THE INCIDENCE OF ExcEss PROFITS TAXATION (1945); MAGILL, THE IMPACT OF
FEDERAL TAXES, c. 5 (1943); MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
(1943) (vol. 7A, including the 1946 Cumulative Pocket Supplement thereto, is devoted to the Excess Profits Tax); 2 MoNTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAxEs--,CoRPORATIONS
AND PARTNERSHIPS, 1946-1947, chs. 6-II; "Excess Profits Taxation" (Symposium),
IO LAW AND CoNTEM. PRoB. 183 (1943); Bryson, "The.Excess Profits Tax Provisions of the Revenue Act of 1942," 91 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 394, 533 (1943); Hynning, "The Excess-Profits Tax of 1940-A Critique," 8 UNiv. Cm. L. REv. 441
(1941); comment, "Excess -Profits Taxation in 1941," 39 MicH. L. REV. 1345
(1941) (in this analysis of the federal legislation comparison is made with the federal
125
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At the risk of possible oversimplification, it may be said that the
legislative object was to levy a special income tax on that portion of
corporate profits attributable to the war effort. The choice of a measure
to be applied to a corporation's earnings for the purpose of determining how much thereof was in excess of normal peacetime earnings presented obvious difficulties and it was to be expected that the selection
of any such yardstick would be somewhat arbitrary. In the end Congress chose alternative standards and gave the taxpayer the benefit of
the standard that resulted in the lower tax. The alternative yardsticks
chosen were "average base period net income" 182 and income measured
by a statutory percentage ( ranging on a graduated basis from 8 % to
5%) of "invested capital." 138
Stated in simple terms, the base period net income method rested
on the theory that the portion of corporate income during each of the
war years, beginning with 1940, which was in excess of the annualized
average income during the four base period years, 1936-1939, should
be earmarked as excessive earnings attributable to the war effort,
or, conversely, that the portion thereof not in excess of such average
base period net income should be equated with nor~al earnings not
attributable to the war effort and therefore taxable in the, usual way
under the ordinary normal and surtax schedules. Similarly the invested capital method incorporated the idea that the portion of corporate income in a war year in excess of the recognized percentage
taken on invested capital was abnormal, war-begotten gain, or, conversely, that the income in the amount measured by the recognized
percentage of invested capital was the kind of fair return on investment which the corporation had a right to expect even in peacetime.
The statute prescribed in detail the methods to be used in computing both "average base period net income" m and "invested capital." m In general the average base period net income was the income
averaged out on an annual basis of the corporation's net income during
the four base years, 1936-1939, presumably selected because they were
typical peacetime earnings years. Obviously many younger corporalegislation of 1917 and with the comparable legislation of Great Britain and Canada);
comment, "The Excess Profits Tax-Proposals for 1941," 50 YALE L. J. 1206
(1941).
132 I.R.C., § 713.
133 I.R.C., § 714.
m I.R.C., § 713(d) through (f).
us I.R.C., §§ 7 I 5 through 719.

818
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tions had not attained the peak level of earning capacity during this
four year period. In cases of that kind the statute permitted, through
application of the so-called "growth formula," 186 an adjustment upwards, where the average earnings of the last two years of the base
period were in 'excess of the average earnings during the initial twoyear period.
Invested capital as defined by statute included two classificationsequity invested capital and borrowed invested capital. Generally,
equity invested capital included cash paid, property paid in and accumulated earnings and profits, with adjustment required, for distributions.187 Borrowed capital as defined 188 was included in invested
capital only to the extent of 50% thereof. Invested capital was required to be reduced by the amount of so-called "inadmissible assets"
which were defined 189 to include stock in other corporations and taxexempt securities.
Brief mention may be made of the "mechanics of computation.
The excess profit§ tax was imposed on "adjusted excess profits net
income." 140 This amount was arrived at by taking as the initial figure
the corporate normal-tax net income, a familiar category. By application of a series of adjustments, corporate normal-tax net iriconie was
converted into "excess profits net income." 141 This figure in turn was
reduced by applying against it a series of statutory credits, including
the exemption referred to above, the excess profits credit determined
by reference to either average base period net income or statutory percentage of invested capital as briefly outlined above, and the unused
excess profits credit for other years in accordance with the carry-back
and carry-forward privileges explained below.142 The net figure thus
arrived at constituted the "~djusted excess profits net income."
An important feature of the excess profits tax law was the provision 148 authorizing a two-year carry-back and a two-year carry-forward
of unused excess profits credit so that in effect a final determination of
excess profits tax liability for any single year took into account a five
186 I.R.C., 713(£).
181

I.R.C.,
I.R.C.,
139 I.R.C.,
140 I.R.C.,
141 I.R.C.,
142
I.R.C.,
18s

§ 718.
§ 719.
§ 720.
§ 710(a) (1).
§ 71 I.
§ 71o(b).

148 See Orfield, "Carry-Back of Unused Excess Profits Credit and Net Loss," 29
MINN. L. REV. 229 (1945).
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year earnings perspective.m This privilege of applying one year's
deficiency to another year's excess with the effect of cancelling or reducing tax liability had important implications for corporations that
found their earnings drastically reduced during the post-war reconversion period, a matter that will be touched upon later.
Despite the staggering task of adjusting the law to the equities of
individual corporate taxpayers Congress took steps in this direction.
The adjustments required for translating normal-tax net income into
excess profits net income included adjustments by reference to abnormal deduction as well as abnormal income items during the base
period years. 145 The statute also took account of abnormalities in income during the excess profits tax years.146 A corporation that had a
record of steady increase in earnings during the base period years was
given the benefit of the "growth formula," by means of which it was
permitted to reconstruct its actual base period net income into a larger
' figure by reference to a record of increased earnings during the last
two years of the base period. 147
But even the growth formula did not take into account a great
many other factors which served in a wide variety of ways to make
actual base period net income an inadequate measure of normal earnings. To attempt to anticipate all such situations and provide a specific
legislative rule to take care of them W'as beyond the realm of possibility. The only alternative was an authorization of relief by reference to broadly stated standards to be interpreted and applied by the
.Commissioner and the United States Tax Court. This was the course
Congress pursued in enacting the relief provisions found in the now
famous section 722 of the Internal Revenue Code.148
"Section 722 relief," 149 as it is popularly known, is probably the
144

I.R.C., § 710(c).
m I.R.C., § 7u(b).
146 I.R.C., § 721.
147 I.R.C., § 7 l 3 (f).
148
Sec. 222 of the Re,·enue Act of 1942 gave code § 722 its definitive form.
149
On the general subject see The Treasury Department's BULLETIN oN SECTION 722 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (1944); TREAS. REG. 112, §§ 35.722l et seq.; 7A MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1943, with 1946
cumulative pocket supplement) §§ 42.75 et seq.; 2 MoNTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAXES-CoRPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS. 1946-1947, c. l l ; BICKFORD, EXCESS PROFITS
TAX RELIEF (1944); HoFFMAN, PRACTICAL PROCEDURES IN CLAIMING Exe~
PROFITS TAX RELIEF (1945); Bierman, "A New Deal Under Section 722," 24
TAXES 988 (1946); Crampton, "Excess Profits Tax Relief for Pre-1940 Corporations," 24 TAXES 23 l ( l 946) ; Diamond, "Problems of Proof and Procedure under
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most interesting feature of the excess profits tax law, if for no other
reason than because of the extremely broad terms in which it is stated.
This section o:ffers to a corporate taxpayer the opportunity of using
a "constructive average base period net income" ( emphasis added) in
any case in which the taxpayer (I) establishes that the excess profits
tax, as otherwise computed, results in "an excessive and discriminatory
tax," and ( 2) establishes what would be "a fair and just amount r~presenting normal earnings to be used as a constructive average base
period net income...." 150 The language of subsection (a) stating the
general rule reads as follows:
"In any case in which the t~ayer establishes that the tax
computed under this subchapter ( without the benefit of this section) results in an excessive and discriminatory tax and establishes
what would be a fair and just amount representing normal earnings to be used a$ a constructive average base period net income
for the purposes of an excess profits tax based upon a comparison
of normal earnings and earnings during an excess profits ,tax
period, the tax shall be determined by using such constructive
average base period net income in lieu of the average base period
net income otherwise determined under this subchapter."
Two principal problems are faced by a corporate taxpayer in attempting to make out a case for relief under section 722. First, it
must demonstrate that the tax as otherwise computed is excessive and
discriminatory by reference to the broad economic and financial standards enumerated in the statute. Secondly, it must establish by construction- a hypothetical fair and just amount representing normal
earnings to be used as a substitute for average base period net income.
Simply to mention these two problems is to give some indication of
Section 722," 24 TAXES 579 (1946); Gfoseclose, "Expanding Business and the Ex- ·
cess Profits Tax," 23 TAXES 879 (1945); Houghton, ''When Tax Relief is Not Relief," 25 TAXES 61 (1947); Kopple, "Suggested Methods in the Application for Sec.
722 Relief," 22 TAXES 308 (1,944); Maloney and Wood, "The Treasury Department's Bulletin on Section 722," 23 TAXES 43 (1944); Mann, "A Commentary
on Relief Provisions," '24 TAXES 659 (1946); Miller, "Another Year of Section 722,"
2 TAX L. REV. 417 (1947); Polk, "Excess Profits Tax Relief," 21 TAXES 434
(1943); Seidman, "The Treasury's Bulletin on Section 722 Relief," 23 TAXES 194
(~945); Simons and Segher, "Relief From Excess Profits Tax Burdens, With Special
Reference to Section 722," 21 TAXES 67 (1943); Tarleau, "Section 722: Safety Valve
of the Excess Profits Tax," IO LAW AND CoNTEM. PRoB. 43 (1943); Tarleau, "Currently Controversial Aspects of Section 722," I TAX L. REV. 197 (1945-1946); 45
MICH. L. REV. 763 (1947).
150
I.R.C., § 722(a).

1 947]

FEDERAL TAXATION,

1941-1947

821

the wide scope of the inquiry and the magnitude of the undertaking.
Economic data and statistics, a study of business trends generally, the
taxpayer's financial history and a chronicle of its earnings records, plus
a lively sense of imagination in the trending of economic probabilities
all enter into the picture.
·On its face section 722 opened up wide vistas for excess profits tax
relief. But it is not an easy or simple matter to secure this relief.
After filing its excess profits tax return for a given year, a taxpayer
that believes itself entitled to section 722 relief is required to make
application to the commissioner on a form prescribed by him.151 The
burden is on the taxpayer to support its application by stating sufficient gtounds and pr~enting adequate evidence in support thereof.
The part played by the bureau in its processing of relief claims is a
very important on'e. Its regulations m and its interpretative bulletin
on section 722 relief, implementing the broad standards incorporated
in the statute and furnishing more concrete guides to their construction, carry considerable weight.
In view of the very. large number of relief applications filed by
taxpayers it was not surprising that the bureau at the outset adopted
a strict position which seemed to preclude relief except in the more
extreme cases.153 In response to public protest that the bureau was not
administering section 722 in accordance with Congressional intent, a
protest which culminated in the Hearings before the Congressional
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, the bureau on July
ro, 1946, set up the E:xcess Profits Tax Council which is now the
agency within the bureau vested with final authority over section 722
relief applications. m There is reason to believe that the creation of the
council marked the beginning of a more liberal bureau policy in dealing with relief applications.
The bureau's determination in disallowing a taxpayer's relief application, in whole or in part, is subject to review by the United States
Tax Court.155 The proceeding on revi~w is similar to the ordinary
deficiency proceeding. However, the Tax Court's determinations with
§ 722(d).
TREAS. REG. II2, §§ 35.722-1 et seq.
153
See Seidman, "Case Histories of Some Section 722 Settled Claims," 24 TAXES
6 (1946).
lH See Bierman's very informative article, "A New Deal Under Section 722,"
24 TAXES 988 (1946).
155
I.R.C., § 732(a).
m I.R.C.?

152
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respect to section 722 matters is final and not subject to judicial review.156 In one of the first section 722 cases that came before it the
Tax Court made clear. that it would not review the bureau's determination unless the taxpayer had adequately stated its grounds for relief
before the bureau in the first instance.157 However, the more recently
decided East Texas Motor Freight Lines case 158 indicates that the Tax
Court will permit a taxpayer to present before the court new and additional evidence to supplement evidence previously presented before
the bureau and in furtherance of grounds advanced in the original
application for relief.
To date the Tax Court has handed down only a handful of decisions under section 722,m and it is too early to draw any general qmclusions with respect to this tribunal's general attitude toward relief
dispensation. However, the decisions granting relief in the East Texas
Motor Freight Lines 160 and the 7-Up Fort Worth Co., lnc. 161 cases
indicate a reasonable liberality in effectuating the purpose and policy
of Congress-a liberality in contrast with the strict policy followed by
the bureau prior to the setting up of the Excess Profits Tax Council.
It is safe to suppose that in the end only a small percentage of the
large number of relief applications will be allowed. Difficulties in
substantiating claims will undoubtedly stand_ in the way of effective
prosecution of the larger pa.rt of them. However, the claims now being processed are numerically large enough to keep section 722 questions fresh in the minds of accountants, lawyers, economists, business
executives, the bureau and the Tax Court for some time to come.
The Revenue Act of 1945 162 repealed the excess profits tax for tax
m I.R.C., § 732 (c).
157

Blum Folding Paper Box Co., Inc., 4 T.C. 7(}5 (194-5).

158 7 T.C. 579 (1946).
159 Uni-Term Stevedoring Co., Inc., 3 T.C. 917 (1944); Blum Folding Paper
Box Co., Inc., 4 T.C. 795 (1945); Fezandie and Sperrle, Inc., 5 T.C. II85 (1945);
Monarch Cap Screw and Mfg. Co., 5 T.C. 1220 (1945); East Texas Motor Freight
Lines, 7 T.C. 579 (1946); Stimson Mill Co., 7 T.C. 1065 (1946); The Homer
Laughlin China Co., 7 T.C. 1325 (1946); 7-Up Fort Worth Co., Inc., 8 T.C. 52
(1947); The Fish Net and Twine Co., 8 T.C. 96 (1947).
For comments on some of these cases see Simons, "The Fezandie Case," 24 TAXES
68 (1946); Simons, "Two Recent 722 Developments," 24 TAXES 254 (1946); 45
MICH. L. REV. 763 (1947).
.
160 7 T.C. 579 (i946). See Landman, "The Taxpayer's First Tax Court Victory in Section 722," 24 TAXES 936 (1946).
161 8 T.C. 52 (1947).
162 Sec, 122(a), repealing subchapter E of chapter 2 of the code.
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years beginning after December 31, 1945. But in repealing the tax
Congress made an important concession by continuing the unused excess profits credit carry-back for one year after repeal of the tax
itself.168 This means that a corporate taxpayer has the privilege of impressing the excess profits tax pattern upon its 1946 earnings for the
purpose of measuring these earnings against the credit allowed under
the excess profits tax law by reference to the alternative income and
invested capital yardsticks. Any unused credit as thus determined
may then be carried back against the taxpayer's 1945 and 1946 earnings in order to reduce the excess profits taxes for these years and thus
establish the taxpayer's right to a refund. Apparently Congress
thought this concession was necessary on the theory that the failure to
earn normal earnings in l 946 was to be regarded as part of the cost of
reconversion from war to peace-time production and hence was to be
considered in a final accounting for taxes on war profits. This allowance of the carry-back privilege, after termination of liability for the
· excess profits tax itself, was criticized in some quarters as unnecessary
in view of the concessions already made in the form of the ro%
post-war refund, the accelerated amortization allowed for emergency
plant facilities, and the possibilities of section 722 relief and on the
further ground that the carry-back privilege offered a premium on
corporate idleness or lack of production in 1946. A passage in the
Senate Finance Committee's report m indicates that it was not unmindful of possible abuse of the unused I 946 credit carry-back privilege and suggests that the last word on this matter may not yet have
been written.
Before leaving this subject reference may be made to a problem of
excess profits tax avoidance which led to specific legislation. The use
of a credit derived from base period income or from invested capital
suggested a scheme whereby corporate taxpayers might acquire inactive corporations for the purpose of exploiting their excess profits
credits.165 To strengthen the commissioner's hand in dealing with practices of this kind Congress included in the Revenue Act of 1943 166 a
188

Revenue Act of 1945, § 122(b) and (c). Sec. 122(c) served to amend

I.R.C., § 71o(c) (2).
164
S. Rep. 655 (accompanying H.R. 4309, 79th Cong., 1st sess.) pp. 29-30
(1945).
165

On the general subject of reorganizations see Lasser, "Reorganizations and
the Excess Profits Tax," 20 N.Y. UNiv. L. Q. 23 (1944).
166
Sec. 1 28.
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provision amending the code by adding thereto section 129 entitled,
"Acquisitions Made to Evade or Avoid Income or Excess Profits Tax."
Under this section which is relevant for purposes of other income taxes
as well as the excess profits tax the commissioner is authorized to disregard an acquisition and to disallow deductions, credits or allowances
based thereon when the principal purpose of the acquisition was to
evade_or to avoid f~deral income or excess profits tax.167

3. Gross Income--Inclusions and Exclusions
(a) Gain on bargain purchase [I.R.C., § 22(a)]
Commissioner v. Smith 168-employee whose corporate employer
gave to him as compensation for services an _option to purchase stock
of another corporation held taxable when he later exercised option,
on gain measured by di:fference· between option price and market value
of stock.169
·
(b) Compromise payments [I.R.C., § 22(a)]

Hort v. Commissioner 110-taxpayer who had received a lump sum
in cancellation of a lease held taxable on entire amount as income in
year of receipt since the lump sum was in lieu of future rental payments.111

{ c) Gain on involuntary conversion [I.R.C., § 22 (a)]
Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co.112-payment received, from insurance company as compensation for loss of property

•

167 See Rudick, "Acquisitions to Avoid Income or Excess Profits Tax: Section
129 of the Internal Revenue Code," 58 HARV. L. REv. 196 (1944).
1 8
~ 324 U.S. 177, 65 S. Ct. 591 (1945), reh. denied 324 U.S. 695, 65 S. Ct.
891 (1945).
169 For an excellent discussion of the Smith case see Ferrall, "Employee Stock
Options and the Smith Case," I TAX L. REv. 225 (1946). For -other discussions of
the problem see Baker, "Stock Options for Executives," 19 HARV. Bus. REv. 106
(1941); Bastedo, "Taxing Employees on Stock 'Purchases,'" 41 CoL. L. REv. 239
(1941); Dillavou, "Employee Stock Options," 20 AccoUNTING REV. 320 (1945).
170 313 U:S. 28, 61 S. Ct. 757 (1941).
171 See the discussion of the case in MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME, rev. ed., 200201 (1945).
Cf. McAllister v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 2d, 1946) 157 F. (2d) 235, holding
that the taxpayer's surrender, on payment of valuable consideration, of her life estate
in a trust resulted in a capital loss, as contrasted with the commissioner's contention
that the transaction resulted in, ordinary gain.
172
313 U.S. 247, 61 S. Ct. 878 (1941).
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wp.ich had been fully depreciated for income tax purposes held taxable
as ordinary gain.
(d) Illegal gain [I.R.C., § 22(a)]
Commissioner v. Wilcox 173-taxpayer held not taxable on embezzled funds since he did not receive or hold the same under a bona
fide claim of right. This case indicates a hitherto unsuspected limitation on the taxability of illegally derived gains.
(e) Alimony [I.R.C., § 22(k)]
The 1942 Revenue Act m added subsection (k) to section 22 to require inclusion in gross income of periodic payments received pursuant
to a decree of divorce or separate maintenance. This amendment
marked a legislative reversal of the rule laid down in the early case·
of Gould v. Gould. 11G The 1942 act176 simultaneously amended section 23 by adding subsection (u) thereto to permit a-deduction to the
husband for such payments.177

(f) Improvements by lessee of lessor's property
[I.R.C., § 22(b)(u)]
The 1942 Revenue Act 178 added paragraph (u) to section 2.2(b)
to exclude from gross income "income, other than rent, derived by a
lessor of real property upon the termination of a lease, representing
the value of such property attributable to buildings erected or other
improvements made by the lessee." Congress thereby repealed the
rule of Helvering v. Bruun.179
178
327 U.S. 404, 66 S. Ct. 546 (1946), noted in 46 CoL. L. REv. 677 (1946),
44 M1cH. L. REv. 885 (1946), 30 MINN. L. REv. 308 (1946).
1 u Sec. 12o(a).
175
245 U.S. 151, 38 S. Ct. 53 (1917).
176
Sec. 12o(b).
177
See Gornick, "Alimony and the Income Tax: Background and Effect of the
Provisions in the Revenue Act of 1942," 29 CoRN. L. Q. 28 (1943); Rudick, "Marriage, Divorce and Taxes," 2 TAx L. REv. 123 (1946-1947).
The 1942 Revenue Act [§ 12o(c) amending code by adding § 171] also prescribed specific treatment of alimony trusts. See the references cited in note 335,
infra.
,
178
Sec. n5(a).
179
309 U.S. 461, 60 S. Ct. 631 (1940), nqted in 53 HARV. L. REV. 1206
(1940), 38 MICH. L. REV. 1356 (1940), 88 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 1023 (1940).
See the note, Hohlt, "Improvements by a Tenant as Realized Income to the Landlord," 24 WASH. UNiv. L. REv. 563 (1939) and the comment, "Improvements
Made by Lessee as Income to Lessor," 37 MICH. L. REv. lIIl (1939).
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(g) Tax-free interest [I.R.C., § 22(b)(4)]
Commissioner v. Shamberg's Estate 180-interest from bonds issued by Port of New York Authority held exempt under section
22 (b) ( 4). This decision marked a defeat for the commissioner in his
attempt to reopen the constitutional issue respecting the tax exempt
status of state securities.181
(h) Gifts payable out of income [I.R.C., § 22(b)(3)]
The 1942 Revenue Act182 amended section 22(b)(3) to provide
that a gift or bequest of the income from property is taxable, to the
extent of the income. Congress thereby overruled the doctrine of
Burnet v. W h_itehouse 183 which had held annuities non-taxable in view
of the gift exclusion.184 The I 942 act 185 simultaneously amended section r62(b) to authorize a deduction to trustees for income distributed
in payment of an annuity, thereby abrogating_ the rule followed in
Helvering v. Pardee. 186
(i) Employees' annuities [I.R.C., § 22(b)(2)(B)]
The r942 Revenue Act187 added a new subparagraph (B) to section 22 (b) ( 2), to state the rule respecting taxability to an employee of
payments made by an employer to purchase employees' annuities and
to define the base for the purpose of determining, by reference to the
3 % rule, the taxability to the employee of annuity payments received
by him. This amendment, when correlated with the simultaneous
180
(C.C.A. 2d, 1944) 144 F. (2d) 998, cert. den., 323 U.S. 792, 65 S. Ct.
433 (1945).
181
On the general subject see Brown, "Intergovernmental Tax Immunity: Do
We Need a Constitutional Amendment?"• 25 WAsH. UNiv. L. REv. 153 (1940);
Shultz, "The Proposal to Tax Income from Governmental Securities-The Case for
Taxation," 7 LAW AND CoNTEM. PR:oB. 217 (1940); Betters, '"The Case Against
Taxation," id. 222; Rouzer, "Legal Problems in Taxing Income from Governmental
Securities," id.- 235; Gray, "Derivative Tax Immunity and the Income From State
Bonds," 41 CoL. L. REv. 1357 (1941); Rottschaefer, "Federal Taxation of State
and Municipal Bond Interest," 20 N.C. L. REv. 141 (1942).
182 Sec. 111(a), amending I.R.C., § 22(b)(3).
183
283 U.S. 148, 51 S. Ct. 374 (1931), noted in 31 CoL. L. REv. 1053
(1931).
184 See Magill, "The Income Tax Liability of Annuities arid Similar Periodical
Payment~," 33 YALE L. J. 229 (1924); Maguire, "Capitalization of Periodical Payments by Gift," 34 HARV. L. REv. 20 (1920); Hess and Guterman, "Annuity
Trusts and the Federal Income Tax," 55 HARV. L. REv. 329 (1942).
185 Sec. 111 (b), amending I.R.C., § 162(b).
186
290 U.S. 365, 54 S. Ct. 221 (1933).
187 Sec. 162(c), amending I.R.C., § 22(b) (2).
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amendments 188 of sections 165 and 23 (p) is seen to be part of a new
and important legislative policy respecting pension trusts and annuity
plans.180

(j) Income from discharge of indebtedness [I.R.C., § 22(b)(9)]
The 1939 Revenue Act1° 0 had added paragraph (9) to section
22 (b) so as to grant a gross income exclusion in respect to income from
discharge of indebtedness in the case of all corporate taxpayers "in
an unsound financial condition." By its terms this amendment was
not made applicable to any discharge of indebtedness occurring before
the date of enactment of the 1939 act or in a taxable year beginning
after December 31, 1942. The I942 Revenue Act 101 amended section 22 (b) ( 9) to make the exclusion of income arising from discharge
of indebtedness applicable, generally to all corporations, whether or
not financially sound. But the exclusion as thus broadened was made
i~applicable to any discharge occurring in a taxable year beginning
after December 31, I 945. Later legislation 102 further extended the
effective date to September 3 1, 1947.
Helvering v. American Dental Co.193-held that a creditor's cancellation of post-due interest and back rent was a gift and therefore
not taxable income to the debtor-taxpayer. Arising under the 1936
Revenue Act and therefore unaffected by the 1939 and 194I amendments, this case indicates a sharp limitation on the general doctrine
deducible from the earlier holding in the Kirby Lumber Co. case.m
188 Revenue Act of 1942, § I 62 (a) and (b).
189 See note 340, infra.
190 Sec. 2 I 5(a), amending I.R.C., § 22 (b) by adding paragraph ( 9).
191

Sec. 114(a), amending I.R.C., §_ 22(b)(9).

192 Sec. 152 of 1945 Revenue Act, amending I.R.C., § 22(b)(9) and (10);
Pub. L. 578, 79th Cong., 2d sess. (1946).
193 318 U.S. 322, 63 S. Ct. 577 (1943), noted in 41 MICH. L. REv. 1208
(194-3). See the discussion of the case in MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME, rev. ed., 254
et seq. (1945).
19' United States Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 52 S. Ct. 4 (1931).
For discussions of the problem antedating the American Dental Co. case see Darrell, "Discharge of Indebtedness and the Federal Income Tax," 53 HARV. L. REV.
977 (1940); Surrey, "The Revenue Act of 1939 and the Income Tax Treatment
of Cancellation of Indebtedness," 49 YALE L. J. 1153 (1942); Warren and Sugerman, "Cancellation of Indebtedness and Its Tax Consequences: I," .4-0 CoL. L. REV.
1326 (1940).

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

(k:) Recovery exclusion-the "tax benefit'' rule
[I.R.C., § 22(b) ( 12)]

Dobson v. Commissioner 195-taxpayer -who had been induced to
buy worthless securities on the strength of fraudulent representations
and who had taken an income tax deduction for the loss on the same,
thereafter recouped the purchase price; held, that the findings and
determination of the Tax Court that recoupment gave rise to no taxable gain since earlier.deduction had not resulted in a tax benefit' were
not to be disturbed on review since the Tax Court's treatment of what
•was viewed as an accounting question did not constitute a reviewable
question of law.196
·
Compare Douglas v. Commissioner 191 and Virginian Hotel Co. v.
H elvering 198 on the question whether the tax benefit rule applies with
respect to depletion and depreciation allowances.
The 1942 Revenue Act 199 added to section 22 (a) a new paragraph
( 12) providing for the exclusion from gross income of income a!tributable to the recovery during the taxable year of a bad debt, prior
tax or delinquency amount to the extent that a prior deduction or
credit taken with respect to such item did not give rise to a tax benefit. 200
The Dobson case did not arise under the 1942 amendment to the
code. The Treasury has taken the position that the policy expressed ·
in section 22(b)(12) applies equally well to recovery of items like
those involved in the Dobson case but not expressly mentioned in the
m 320 U.S. 489, 64 S. Ct. 239 (1943).
196

See Plumb, "The Tax Benefit Rule Today," 57 ,HARV. L. REV. 129 (1943);
Plumb, "The Tax Benefit Rule Tomorrow," id. 675 (1944).
The matter of reviewability of the Tax Court's determinations is taken up at a
later-point in the text under the title, "The Role of the United States Tax Court."
197
322 U.S. 275, 64 S. Ct. 988 (1944). In this case the Supreme Court
was evenly divided on the question whether upon cancellation of a mineral lease,
pursuant to which the lessee had paid a minimum royalty even though no ore had
been mined, -the lessor was required to restore to gross income the depletion allowances for earlier years held properly taken into account in a subsequent adjustment
sulted in a tax benefit.
198
319 U.S. 523, ·63 S. Ct. 1260 (1943). Here excessive depreciation allowances for earlier years held properly taken into account in a subsequent adjustment
of depreciation basis even though the excessive allowances had not resulted in a tax
benefit.
·
m Sec. n6(~), amending I.R.C., § 22(b) by adding paragraph (12).
200
See the articles by Plumb, cited in note 196, supra.
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code.201 However, the Regulations preclude application -of the tax
benefit rule to depletion and depreciation items.

4. Deductions
(a) General authorization and limitations 202
( 1) Ordinary and necessary trade or business expenses
[I.R.C., § 23(a)(1)]
(i) Trade or business
See Higgins v. Commissioner; 208 City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v.
Helvering; 20 ¼ United States v. Pyne. 205 The holding common to the
three cases was that the managing of investments did not constitute
a trade or business, consequently the expenses incident to such management were not deductible.
Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner 200-payments made by
a parent corporation to a subsidiary corporation pursuant to contract
whereby parent agreed to reimburse subsidiary for operating deficits,
held disallowed as deductions since these expenses did not relate to
parent's business.
Commissioner v. Flowers 20'--attorney who maintained law office in Jackson, Mississippi, where he was domiciled and maintained
his family residence, served as counsel for railroad with headquarters
in Mobile, Alabama, and spent a substantial amount of his time there;
held that expenses of travel to Mobile and of board and lodging there
See TREAS. REG. III, § 29.22(b)(12)-1, as amended by T:D. 5307 and
T.D. 5454.
202
On the general subject see Gray, "The Federal Taxing Power and the Income Tax," 26 MINN. L. REv. 421 (1942); Professor (now Dean) Griswold's comm!!nt, "An Argument Against the Doctrine that Deductions Should be Narrowly
Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace," 56 HARV. L. R'.Ev. n42 (1943).
203
3,12 U.S. ~12, 61 S. Ct. 475 (1941), noted in 41 CoL. L. REV. 757 (1941),
17 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 38 (1941). See the comments, 'Expense Deductions Allowed in Determining an Investor's Taxable Income," 27 VA. L. REV. 349 (1941);
''Deductions-Expenses in Carrying On a Trade or Business-Personal Investment
Cwts," 1942 Wis. L. REv. 432.
20
¼ 313 U.S. 121, 61 S. Ct. 896 (1943).
201
313 U.S. 127, 61 S. Ct. 893 (1943).
208
319 U.S. 590, 63 S. Ct. 1279 (1943) • The lower court decision is noted in
+3 CoL. L. REv. 234 (1943).
201
326 U.S. 465, 66 S. Ct. 250 (1946), reh. den., 326 U.S. 812, 66 S. Ct.
482 (1946), noted in 46 CoL. L. REV. 489 (1946); 44 M1cH. L. REV. 882 (1946).
See the comment on the case in 55 YALE L. J. 603 (1946).
201
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were not deductible. The Tax Court had rested its determination
on ground that expenses were not incurred away from "home," but
chief ground of Supreme Court's affirmance was that expenses were
not incurred pursuant to business.

( ii) Ordinary and necessary 208
Textile Mills Security Corp. v~ Commissioner 200-Regulations
sustained in denying a deduction to corporation for lobbying expenses
incurred in promoting legislation.
Commissioner v. Heininger 210-litigation expenses incurred by
dentist in mail order business in defending against fraud order issued
by Post Master held ordinary and necessary, hence deductible, si~ce
fraud order if it had remained in effect would have destroyed taxpayer's business.211
MacDonald v. Commissioner 2u-taxpayer who had been appointed to a state court to complete an unexpired term, thereafter
waged an unsuccessful campaign for election to the court upon ex-piration of the interim term; his campaign expenses, including substantial contributions to party "war-chest," held not deductible
although Court conceded that under section 41 of code taxpayer's
office as judge constituted "trade or business."

( 2) Ordinary and necessary non-Erade or non-business expenses 1
[I.R.C., § 23(a)(2)]
The I 942 Revenue Act 213 added the very important paragraph
(2) to section 23(a) to allow, in the case of an individual, "all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
208
On the general question of reasonable allowances for salaries see Baker, "A
'Just Gauge' for Executive Compensation," 22 HARV. Bus. REv. 75 (1943); Tyson,
"Bonus Problems Under the Revenue Act of 1938," 67 J. OF AccouNTANCY 9+
(1939); Wolder, "Facts and Figures on Reasonable Compensation," 24 TAXES 150
(1946); note, "New Light on 'A Reasonable Allowance for Salaries,'" 59 HARV. L.
REV. 286 (1945).
.
209
314 U.S. 326, 62 S. Ct. 272 (1941). See the note, "Deduction of Business
Expenses: Illegality and Public Policy,'' 54 HARV. L. REV. 852 (1941).
210
320 U.S. 467, 64 S. Ct. 249 (1943), noted in 42 MxcH. L. REv. n43
(1944).
211 See Lynch, "Legal Expenses as Deductions From Income,'' 12 FoRDHAM L.
REv. 8 (1943).
212
323 U.S. 57, 65 S. Ct: 96 (1944), noted in 33 ILL.· B. J. 243 (1945), 39
ILL. L. REv. 298 (1945), 30 IowA L. REv. 577 (1945), 43 M1cH. L. REv. 823
(1945), Diamond, "The Shadow of MacDonald v. Commissioner," 16 PA. B. A. Q.
293 (1945).
218
Sec. 121(a), amending I.R.C., § 23(a).
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year for the production or collection of income, or for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income." m Obviously designed to remedy the situation
created by the disallowances under section 23(a)(1)· of the expenses
involved in the Higgins, City Bank Farmers Trust Co. and Pyne
cases, referred to above, the language used in the amendment suggested an even broader reach. The two decisions noted below are
must reading on the interpretation of this amendment.
MacDonald v. Commissioner 215--see reference to case above r~pecting deductibility of campaign expenses as ordinary and necessary
trade or business expenses; the same expenses also disallowed under
section 23(a)(2) on the ground that the 1942 amendment intended
only to correct the result reached in the Higgins case et alia under
section 23 (a) ( 1) and not to liberalize the deductibility of expenses
incident to trade or business. The forcible and persuasive dissenting
op1nion suggests a broader interpretation of the 1942 amendment
on the theory that the legislative intent was to tax net income only.
Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner 216-taxpayer-trustee incurred.
legal expenses arising out of various transactions having to do with
distributions to beneficiaries and legatees; these expenses held deductible under section 23(a)(2) as necessary and proper expenses in-.
curred in the management of the trust. While proceeding on a theory
that paragraph ( 2) of this section is to be construed in pari materia
with paragraph ( 1), the case indicates a liberal interpretation of the
1942 amendment with respect to the deductibility of expenses incurred
for the "management, conservation or maintenance of property held
for the production of income." zrr
2

H See Kent, "The Revenue Act of 1942," 43 CoL. L. REV. I at 16 (1943);
Rottschaefer, ''The Revenue Act of 1942," 27 M1NN. L. REV. 217 at 257 (1943);
comment, "Income Tax: Deductibility of Nonbusiness and Nontrade Expenses," 34
CAL. L. REV. 212 (1946).
.
215
323 U.S. 57, 65 S. Ct. 96 (1944). See notes on the decision cited in note
212, supra.
216
•
325 U.S. 365, 65 S. Ct. 1232 (1945).
217
See Brodsky and McKibbin, "Deduction of Non-trade or Non-business Expenses," 2 TAX L. REv. 39 (1946); Schwanbeck, "Non-Trade and Non-Business Deductions," 22 TAXES 466 ( 1944); Seghers, "Deductibility of Investors' Expenses
antler Section 23(a)(2) of the Internal Rev~nue Code," 81 J. OF AccouNTANCY 130
(1946); comment, "Income Tax: Deductibility of Nonbusiness and Nontrade Expenses," 34 CAL. L. REv. 212 (1946).
·
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(3) Capital expenditures [I.R.C., § 24(a)]
Spreckles v. Commissioner 218-taxpayer, not a dealer in securities,
disallowed a deduction for selling commissions paid to brokers since ·
commissions are to be treated as an offset against sale price in the
determination of gain or loss on later sale or exchange.
'
F. H. E. ,Oil Co. v. Commissioner 210-the circuit court's first
opinion in this case, questioning the validity of the provision of the
Regulations 220 granting oil operators an option either to charge to expense or to capitalize so-called "intangible drilling and development
expenditures," led to an expression of Congressional intent 221 in support of· the Regulation.
The 1942 Revenue Act 222 added paragraph (7) to section 24(a)
of the code to disallow taxes and carrying charges as expenses where
in accordance with regulations the same are chargeable to· capital ac- ,
count with respect to property, and taxpayer elects in accordance with
regulation to treat such items as so chargeable.
(b) Optional standard deduction [I.R.C., § 23(aa)]
Reference has already been made 228 to the provision of ,th~ Individual Income Tax Act of 1944 adding subsection (aa) to section
23 of the code to authorize the taking by individual taxpayers of an
optional standard· deduction in lieu of specific deductions authorized
under section 23. In general it may be said that the optional standard ·deduction takes the place of all deductions other than expenses
incurred in trade or business or expenses .attributable to the earning of
rents or royalties. The items not covered by the optional standard
deduction become relevant in translating gross income into "adjusted
gross income" under section 22 ( n} of the code.

( c) Specific deductions
(1) Alimony [I.R.C., § 23(u)]
The 1942 Revenue Actm added subsection (u) to section 23 to allow a husband deductions for periodic payments pursuant to a decree
of divorce or permanent maintenance. 22 G
218

315 U.S. 626, 62 S. Ct. 777 (1942), noted 1942 Wis. L. REv. 432•.
(C.C.A. 5th, 1945) 147 F. (2d) 1002, reh. den., 149 F. (2d) 238.
220
TREAS, REG. I I I , § 29.23(m)-16 (b)(1).
221
H. Con. Res. 50, 79th Cong., Ist sess. (1945).
222
Sec. 13o(a), amending I.R.C., § 24(a).
228
See note I 10, supra.
224
Sec. 12o(b), amending I.R.C., § 23.
22 G See 'Gornick, "Alimony and the Income Tax: Background and Effect of the
Provisions in the Revenue Act of 1942," 29 CoRN. L. Q. 28 (1943).
219
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(2) Extraordinary medical expenses [I.R.C., § 23(x)]
The 1942 Revenue Act 226 added subsection (x) to section 23 to
authorize a deduction for expenses of ~edical care of the taxpayer, ·his
spouse and dependents. As further amended in 1944 227 and 1945 228
this subsection now authorizes a deduction for such expenses to the
extent that they exceed 5% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income.
(3) Interest on Indebtedness .[I.R.C., § 23(b)]
The John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner and Talbot Mills v. Commissioner 229-held in these companion cases that Tax Court's findings
on deductibility by corporation of payments on hybrid .types of securities were not to be disturbed by reviewing courts. The opposite results
reached by the Tax Court in these two cases indicated a narrow line of
distinction. 280
The 1942 Revenue Act 281 added paragraph (6) to section 24(a)
to disallow deductions for amounts paid or ·accrued in indebtedness
incurred or continued to purchase a single premium life insurance or
endowment contract.

(4) Taxes [I.R.C., §§ 23(c) and (d)] 282
Wisconsin Gas & Electric Co. v. United States 238-tax imposed by
Wisconsin Dividend Privilege Tax Act denied as deduction to corporation under section 23(c) since tax not imposed upon the corporation
and also disallowed under
section 23 ( d) since the corporation
in
.
.
Sec. 127(a), amending I.R.C., § 23.
lndividual Income Tax Act of 1944, § 8(c), amending I.R.C., § 23(x).
228
Revenue Act of 1-945, § 102(b)(1), amending I.R.C., § 23(x).
2211
326 U.S. 521, 66 S. Ct. 299 (1946). See the comment on these cases in
-4-4 MICH. L. REV. 827 (1946).
280
On the general question see Winstead, "Can a Corporation Deduct From
Gross Income Dividends on Preferred Stock?" 23 TEX. L. REV. 39 (1944). On the
various hybrid types of securities see GuTHMANN & DouGALL, CoRPORATE FINANCIAL
PoLICY 519 (1942); Berl, "The Vanishing Distinction Between Creditors and Stockholders," 76 UN1v. PA. L. REv. 814 (1928). For briefer treatments of the tax ques,tion see 40 CoL. L. REv. 1084 (1940); 55 HARV. L. REv. u89 (1942); 90 UNIV.
PA. L. REv•. 730 (1942); 50 YALE L. J. 151 (1940).
281
Sec. 129, amending I.R.C., § 24(a).
zs 2 On the general subject see Brown, "The Treatment for Federal Income Tax
Purposes of Errors in the Deduction of Other Taxes," 85 UNiv. PA. L. REV. 385
(1937); Ellis, "Deductions for Accrued Taxes," 14 TAX MAG. 197 (1936); Gray,
"Deductions From Gross Income: Payments and Accruals Deductible as 'Taxes,' " 3
WASH. & LEE L. REv. l (1941); Gray, "Synchronizing Deductible Taxes and Taxable Income," 9 UN1v. Cm. L. REv. 442 (1942); Layman, "Income Tax Deduction of Federal and State Social Security Taxes," 15 TAX MAG. 719 (1937).
zss 322 U.S. 526, 64 S. Ct. 1106 (1944).
226

227
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charging the tax against the stockholder's dividends was reimbursed
for the same.
Magruder v. Supplee 23"'-purchaser of real estate who agreed to
assume payment of accrued property tax on the real estate disallowed
deduction for same since tax not imposed upon him by law.
The 1942 Revenue Act 285 amended section 23(c) to authorize a
deduction for retail sales taxes imposed by local law where sales tax
is stated separately as part of purchase price and purchaser-taxpayer
actually pays the same. 286
The 1943 Revenue Act 287 further amended this section to disallow deductions for federal excise taxes. However, such excises are
still deductible under section 23(a) as trade or business expenses.

(5) Taxes and interest paid to cooperative apartment corporations
[I.R.C., § 23(z)]
The 1942 Revenue Act2 38 added subsec;tion (z)" to section 23 to
place tenant-stockholders of cooperative apartment house corporation
in the same position as house-owners respecting deductibility of
amounts paid for taxes and interest ..
-

( 6) Contributions to employees' trust [I.R.C., § 23 (p)]
The 1942 Revenue Act 289 completely revised subsection (p)~ respecting deductibility by employers of contributions to an employees'
trust or annuity plan and of compensation under a deferred-payment
plan. This very significant amendment dovetailed into the important
1942 amendments 240 of section 165 ( dealing with pension trusts) m
and of 22 (b) ( 2) referred to above under gross income inclusions
("employees' annuities").

(7) Foreign war losses [I.R.C., § 127]
The 1942 Revenue Act 242 added the comprehensive an1 important
\

284

316 U.S. 394, 62 S. Ct. 1162 (1942).
Sec. 122, amending I.R.C., § 23{c).
286 See the discussion of the 1942 amendment in Rottschaefer, "The Revenue
Act of 1942," 27 MINN. L. REv. 217 at 258 (1943).
287
Sec. 111; amending I.R.C., § 23{c)(1).
·
238
Sec. 128, amending I.R.C., § 23.
289
Sec. 162(b), amending I.R.C., § 23{p).
240 Revenue Act of 1942, §. 162{;) and (c).
2
n See note 340, infra.
242
Sec. 156{a), amending I.R.C., to insert new § 127.
235
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section 127 authorizing deduction for war losses and defining the
limits thereon.
(8) Carry-back of net operating loss [I.R.C., § 122]
The 1942 Revenue Act 248 amended section 122 to permit in addition to the· two-year carry-over of net operating loss as authorized by
earlier law a two-year carry back of net operating loss. 244

( 9) Losses by individuals [I.R.C., § 23 (g)]
Boehm v. Commissioner 245-worthlessness of stock for purposes of
permitting loss deduction under section 23 ( e) of Revenue Act of l 93 6
held determined by an objective test based on "identifiable events"
rather than by a subjective test based on the taxpayer's reasonable and
honest belief supported by his conduct, and deduction taken by taxpayer for year in question accordingly disallowed.
The 1938 Revenue Act 246 withdrew losses based on worthlessness
of stock from the section 2 3 ( e) categories of ordinary losse$ and
placed them in the category of capital losses under section 23(g). As
carried forward into the code this section provides that the loss sustained when stock becomes worthless shall be treated as a loss arising
from the sale or exchange of a capital asset. 247 The Boehm case is
therefore not relevant under the present section 23 ( e) of the code.

(IO) Bad debts [I.R.C., § 23 (k)]
The l 942 Revenue Act 248 amended section 23 (k) ( l) to eliminate,
effective as to all taxable years beginning after December 31, 1938
Sec. 153(a), amending I.R.C., § 122(b).
See Fedder, "Net Loss Carry-Backs," 23 TAXES 429 (1945); Landman,
"Carry-backs and Carry-overs," 24 TAXES 259 (1946); Maloney, "Carry-overs and
Carry-backs," 22 TAXES 218 ( 1944); Orfield, "Carry-Back of Unused Excess Profits
Credit and Net Loss," 29 MINN. L. REv. 229 (1945); Rottschaefer, "The Revenue
Act of 1942," 27 MINN. L. REv. 217 at 267 (1943); Tremper, "Net Operating
Losses Under Section 122," 12 THE CoNTROLLER 375 (1944).
245
326 U.S. 287, 66 S. Ct. 120 (1945), noted in 44 MicH. L. REv. 879
(1946).
246
52 Stat. L. 447.
247 See Brown, "The Time for Taking Deductions for Losses and Bad Debts
for Income Tax Purposes," 84 UNJv. PA. L. REv. 41 (1935); Lynch, "Losses Resulting from Stock Becoming Worthless-Deductibility under Federal Income Tax
Laws," 8 FORDHAM L. REv. 199 (1939); comment, "Nondeductible Capital Losses
and Bona Fide Sales Under the Federal Income Tax," 49 YALE L. J. 75 (1939).
248
Sec. 124(a), amending I.R.C., § 23 (k).
243

244
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the requirements of ascertainment of worthlessness and charge-o;ff as
prerequisite to a bad debt deduction. Under the law as so amended
bad debts are deductible in the year when they actually become worthless. 249 Because the 1942 amendment had failed to take partially
worthless debts into account and since doubt had arisen whether under
the amendment a deduction could still -be taken on a charge-off of
partially worthless debt, the 1943 Revenue Act 250 further amended
paragraph ( 1) to reinstate the former wording permitting a deduction
for a debt recoverable only in part "in an amount not in excess of ·the
part charged off within the taxable year."
The 1942 Revenue Act 251 further amended section 23(k) by adding paragraph ( 4) to restrict the deduction in the case of an individual
for loss on "non-business bad debts" by requiring the same to be
treated as a loss arising from the sale or exchange of a short-term
capital asset.

(n) Depreciation [I.~.C., § 23(1)]
Detroit Edison Co. v. Cpmmissioner 252--electric power company
not entitled to deduction for depreciation in respect to cost of extension of its facilities, to extent such cost was borne by customers whose.
payments to the company therefor were neither refunded nor refundable.
'
Virginian Hotel Co. v. Helvering 258--excessive amounts claimed
by taxpayer for depreciation in its tax returns for earlier years held
properly deducted from cost.in a later readjustment of the property's
depreciation basis even though the excessive depreciation taken in the
earlier years had not resulted in a tax benefit.
'

249

For the reasons which led to a change in the statute, see Paul, "Suggested
Modifications of the Bad Debt Provision of the Federal Revenue Act," 22 CoiN.
L. Q. 196 (1937), reprinted in PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TmTION 235 (ISt
Series, 1937). For a comparison of the old and new provisions, see Rottschaefer, "The
Revenue Act of 1942," 27 MINN. L. REv. 217 at 260 (1943). See also Gillette,
"Debts Which Become Worthless Within the Taxable Year," 23 TAXES 972 (1945).
250 Sec. 113(a), amending I.R.C., § 23(k)(1).
·
251
Sec. 124(a}, amending l.~.C., § 23(k).
252
319 U.S. 98, 63 S. Ct. 902 (1943).
258
319 U.S. 523, 63 S. Ct. 1260 (1943). See note 197, supra, in connection
with the reference in the text at that point to the "tax benefit" rule.
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( 12) Amortization of emergency facilities
[I.R.C., §§ 23(t) and 124]
This very important deduction authorization, first added to the
code by the Second Revenue Act of 1940 m and thereafter amended
by the Revenue Act of 1942,255 was one of the most significant tax
conces~ions granted by Congress as an incentive to the construction
and acquisition by private capital of facilities necessary to the successful prosecution of the war effort.256 Congress was faced with practical
considerations in dealing with an urgent problem. Taxpayers in devoting private capital to special war facilities faced the risk of finding
these facilities worthless when the war ended. Profits from the operation of these facilities were subject to the special war-time excess
profits tax. But profits determined by reference to ordinary depreciation rates based on the physical life of the facilities and not taking into
account the potential functional usely5sness of the facilities at the war's
· end would give a distorted picture of income attributable to the war
effort. Tax-wise this preSented a picture calculated to discourage the
use of private capital in financing new war industry. To meet this
situation Congress authorized the amortization deduction for which
detailed treatment is specified in section 124. Under this section a taxpayer was permitted to amortize his capital investment in emergency
facilities over a sixty-month period, in lieu of taking the ordinary
depreciation allowance. The sixty-month period began with the month
following the month in which the facility was completed or acquired.
A very important feature of the law permitted accelerated amortization over a period shorter than the sixty-months in case the war was
declared terminated before the sixty-months expired. This meant that
many taxpayers recouped tax-wise over a period substantially shorter
than five years their entire investment in emergency facilities which
in many instances continued useful after the war for peacetime industrial use.
2

H Sec. 301 of the Second Revenue Act of 1940, 54 Stat. L. 974, amending
I.R.C., § 23, and § 302 adding I.R.C., § 124.
255
Sec. 15 5, amending various subsections of I.R.C., § I 24.
256
See Bock, "Accelerated Amortization of Emergency Facilities," 22 TAXES 482
(1944); Brown and Patterson, "Accelerated Depreciation: A Neglected Chapter in
War Taxation," 57 Q. J. EcoN. 630 (1943).
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Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner; Commissioner v. Crawlord 258-taxpayer leased land to companies for production of oil and
other minerals in consideration of a cash bonus, a royalty in the usual
form, and an agreement that taxpayer-lessor should receive a percentage of the net money profits realized by lessees from their operations under the lease; held that taxpayer was entitled to deduct depletion in respect to the percentage of net income since, applying the test
of Palmer v. Bender, it had an "economic interest" in the oil in place.
Burton-Sutton Oil Co., Inc. v. Commissioner 259-taxpayer, assignee of a contract relating to oil land pursuant to which grantee
agreed to pay grantor so% of net profits from operations, held entitled to deduct the so% payments from its gross income on theory
that they represented rents or royalties and not capital expenditures.
This case indicates that the right to net profit payments, standing by
itself, constitutes an economic interest, with the result that the net
profits payments can be characterized as depletable income.
The r942 Revenue Act 260 amended section rr4(b)(4) to extend
the percentage depletion allowance privilege to additional designated
minerals and to abrogate the election requirement. 261 Accordingly the
257 On the general subject, see ANDERSON, O1L AND GAS FEDERAL INCOME TAX
MANUAL (1944); Appleman, "Taxation of Net Profits from Oil and Gas Properties,"
23 TAXES 1009 (1945); Beveridge, "Depletion of Oil and Gas Properties for In. come Tax Purposes," 36 MICH. L. REv. 568 (1938); Beveridge, ''.Depletion Allowance on Oil and Gas Leases," 8 TEX. B. J. 74 (1945); Disney, "The Depletion
Allowance," 16 TAX MAG, 262 (1938); Eaton, "Taxation of Oil' Payments," 19
TAXES 661 (1941); comment, Galvin, "Federal Income Tax-Percentage Depletion.
of Oil and Gas Wells," 21 TEX. L. REv. 410 (1943); comment, Jackson, "Percentage Depletion of Oil and Gas Wells-Another View," 21 TEX, L. REv. 798
(1943); comment, Mentz, "Depletion Deduction with Respect to Oil and Gas Interests under the Federal Income Tax," 4 LA. L. REv. 586 (1942); Rabkin and
Johnson, "The Income Tax Upon Oil and Gas Interests," 90 UNiv. PA. L. REV. 383
( I 942) ; Ray and Hammonds, "The Income Tax on Proceeds From· the Sale of Oil
Payments: the Validity of G.C.M. 24849," 25 TEX. L. REv. 121 (1946); Ross,
"Depletion on Oil and Gas Leases; Court Decisions Affecting Leasing Transactions,
Collated," 21 TAXES 73 (1943); Walker, "Oil Payments," 20 TEX. L. REv. 259
(1942); Walker, "Developments in the Law of Oil and Gas During the War Years,"
25 TEX, L. REv. l (1946).
258
326 U.S. 599, 66 S. Ct. 409 (1946), noted in 44 MICH. L. REv. 883
(1946). See Appleman, "An Analysis of the Kirby and Crawford Decisions," 24
TAXES 376 (1946).
259
328 U.S. 25, 66 S. Ct. 861 (1946).
260
Sec. 145(a), amending I.R.C.; § 114(b)(4).
261
See Rottschaefer, "The Revenue Act of 1942," 27 MINN. L. REv. 217 at
262 (1943).
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depletion allowance may now be computed either on a percentage or
cost basis, whichever yields the larger deduction.
The r943 Revenue Act 262 further amended section u4(b)(4) to
extend the percentage depletion allowance privilege to additional designated minerals.
(r4) Amortizable bond premium [I.R.C., §§ 23(v) and I25}
The I 942 Revenue Act 263 amended the code to authorize a deduction for amortizable bond premium as defined in the new section. This
new section covers the matter in a detailed and comprehensive way.m

5. Accounting

(a) Taxable periods
(r) Ant/!Ual accounting
(i) Carry-back of net operating•loss [I.R.C., § r22]. 265 See discussion of same under "Deductions" above. The effect of the two-year
carry-back and carry-forward of net operating losses is to establish a
five-year accounting period in setting-off operating losses against gains.
(ii) Recovery exclusion-the tax benefit rule [I.R.C., §
22 (b) ( I 2)]. See discussion under "Gross Income-Inclusions and Exclusions," above.266 The effect of the tax benefit rule as codified by the
r942 Revenue Act and as recognized judicially in the Dobson case is
to set some limit on the general doctrine that each year's tax accounting
must stand on its own feet.
(2) Accruals on death of taxpayer [I.R.C., §§ 42(a) and !26]
Helvering v. Estate of Enright 261--section 42 of I934 Revenue
Act interpreted to require in the case of a cash basis deceased taxpayer
incl1~.sion in his income for the period terminated by his death of all
items accrued to date of death.
Putnam's Estate v. Commissioner 268-dividend declared prior to
262

268

Sec. 124(a), amending I.R.C., § u4(b) (4).
Sec. 126(a), amending I.R.C., § 23, and § 126(b) adding § 125 to the

code.
26
' See Gushee, "Bond Discount or Premium at Refunding," 2 l AccopNTING
REV. 61 (1946); Healy, "Treatment of Debt Discount and Premiums Upon Refunding," 73 J. OF AccoUNTANCY 199 (1942); Kent, "The Revenue Act of 1942," 43
CoL. L. REv. 1 at 20 (1943); cpmment in 56 HARV. L. 'REV. 990 (1943).
265
For references, see notes 243 and 244, supra.
266
For references, see notes 195-201, supra.
267
312 U.S. 636, 61 S. Ct. 777 (1941).
268
324 U.S. 393, 65 S. Ct. 811 (1945).
For discussioIJ. of the accrual-to-death question under the law prior to the 1942
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date of death of cash receipts taxpayer but payable to stockholders of
record on date after his death, held not accrued within meaning of
section 42 of 1938 Revenue Act and hence not includible in deceased
taxpayer's income. The Enright case was distinguished on the ground
that there the accrual related to income attributable to a partner's
services.
The 1942 Revenue Act 269 amended section 42 and added the new
section 126 to state the general rule that income which is not includible
in a deceased taxpayer's gross income for the taxable period terminating with his death under the accounting method customarily employed
by him is taxable, when received, to the person who actually receives
it.270

(

'

(b) Accounting methods-cash receipts versus accrual 211
(1) Noninterest-bearing obligations issued at discount
[I.R.C., § 42(b) and (c)]
1941 Revenue Act 272 amended section 42 by adding subsection
(b) authorizing cash receipts taxpayers to account for increase in reamendments, see Gemmill, "Accruals to Date of Death for lncom~ Tax Purposes," 90 ,
UNIV. PA. L. REV. 702 (1942); Farrand and Farrand, "Treatment of Accrued Items
in the Event of the Death of a Taxpayer," 13 So. CAL. L. REV. 431 (1940); Parlin,
"Accruals to Date of Death for Income Tax Purposes," 87 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 295
(1939); Wentz, "Distortion of Income Tax," 19 TAXES 707 (1941); comment,
"Accrual of Dividends Under Section 42 of the Revenue Act of 1938," 19 So. CAL.
L. REV. 77 (1945); comment, "Taxation of Decedent's Accrued Income Under
Sections 42 and 43 of the Internal Revenue Code," 42 CoL. L. REv. 457 (1942);
comment, "Taxation of Partnership Assets Received by a Deceased Partner and His
Estate," 40 MICH. L. REv. 733 (1942). ·
269
Sec. 134{a) and {e), amending I.R.C., § 42(a) and adding I.R.C., § 126,
respectively. Sec. 134(b) of the 1942 act, amending I.R.C., § 43, similarly changed
the rule with respect to deductions and credits.
·
27
° For discussion of the problems under the law as amended, see Guterman,
"Income of Decedents-New Problems in Income and Estate Taxes under Section
126," N.Y. UNiv.. FouRTH ANNUAL INST. ON FED. TAX 24 (1946); Roehner, "Effect of Section 126 on Business-Liquidation Agreements," So J. OF ACCOUNTANCY
364 (1945).
271
On the general subject, see MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME, rev. ed., c. 5 (1945);
MAY, FINANCIAL AccouNTING (1943); Hulse, "Can the Cash Basis of Reporting be
Justified Now?" 24 TAXES 139 (1946); May, "Taxable Income and Accounting Basis
for Determining It," 40 J. OF AccoUNTANCY 248 (1925); Montgomery, "Accounting and the Concept of Income," in Lecture on Taxation (Columbia Univ. Symposium, 1932) 55; Zysman, "Constructive Receipt of Income," 16 TAX MAG. 715
(1938); comments in 51 HARV. L. REv. 716 (1938), 53 HARV. L. REV. 851
(1940), 30 IowA L. REv. 308 (1945), 19 So. CAL. L. REv. 77 (1945).
272
Sec. 114, amending I.R.C., § 42.
'
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demption price either _as it accrues or on a cash receipts basis when the
obligation is redeemed or sold. This same act 278 added subsectio12, ( c)
to require income by way of discount on noninterest-bearing short term
obligations issued on a discount basis to be accounted for when such
obligations are redeemed or sold.

(2) Compensation for services rendered for period of thirty-six
months or more and back pay (I.R.C., § rn7)
The I 942 Revenue Act 274 amended section 107 ( which had been
added by the 1939 Revenue Act to mitigate the harshness of cash receipts accounting for deferred compensation for services rendered
during a period of five years or more by substituting in effect an accrual accounting for the same) to ·reduce the period to thirty-six
months or more, and also added subsection (b) to extend the same
relief to artists, writers, and inventors.
The 1943 Revenue Act 275 added subsection (d) to permit in effect
an accounting on an accrual basis for "back pay" when the amount of
such pay received by an individual during the taxable. year exceeds
15% of the individual's gross income for such year.276
(3) Accrual deduction for contingent obligation (I.R.C., § 43)
Dixie Pine Products. Corp. v. Commissioner 271---'c!ccrual deduction
disallowed for taxes contested by taxpayer and never paid by it, since
contingent liability may not be accrued. 21a
Security Flour Mills v. Commissioner 219-facts essentially the
same as in the Dixi.e Pine Products Corp. case and same result reached.
A noteworthy aspect of the case was the Court's rejection of the taxpayer's argument that section 43 of the code authorizes the substitution
of cla hybrid system, partly annual and partly transactional," for that
of annual accounting periods.280
273

Sec. n5(a), amending I.R.C., § 42.

ut Sec. 139(a), amending I.R.C., § rn7.

Sec. 119(a), amending I.R.C., § 107.
generally, Vernon, "Some Current Problems Under Section 1o'7," I
TAX L. REv. 357 (1946).
277
320 U.S. 516, 64 S. Ct. 364 (1944).
278
See Jones, "What the Dixie Pine Decision Means," 23 TAXES 336 (1945).
279
321 U.S. 281, 64 S. Ct. 596 (1944).
280
See Edelmann, "Time for Accrual and Deduction of Taxes," 23 TAXES IIO
(1945), also Jones' article, cited note 278, supra. For earlier discussions, see the
articles by Brown, Ellis and Gray cited in note 232, supra.
275

:mi See

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 45

6. Sales and Exchanges
(a) Transactions distinguished from sales -and exchanges of property
Hort v. Commissioner 281--see reference to case under "Gross
Income-Inclusions· and Exclusions," above; taxpayer who had received a lump sum in cancellation of a lease having several years to
run did not report it as income but instead reported as a loss an
amou~t representing the difference between the present value of the
unmatured rental payments and the fair rental value of the premises
for the remainder of the lease; the entire amount received was held
taxable as ordinary income in year of receipt and no deduction allowed
on a loss theoiy.282
Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co.288--see reference
to case under "Gross Income-Inclusions and Exclusions," above;
inv:oluntary conversion of property through loss by fire held not a sale
or exchange of property and gain resulting from insurance payments
therefore held taxable as ordinary gain.
Choate v. Commissioner 284-taxpayer who transferred an oil lease
and equipment for cash and a royalty interest; held entitled to allowance for unrecovered cost of physical equipment. With respect to this
equipment, the transaction was viewed as a sale of property and not as
a sublease.

(b) Cost b;1sis [I.R.C., § rr3(a)]
Helvering v. Reynolds 285-where taxpayer, pursuant to father's
will, acquired contingent remainder interest in securities, the value for
purpose of determining cost basis of same in connection with sale thereof by taxpayer, was value at ,time of father's death since this was the
time of "acquisition" within the meaning of paragraph ( 5) of section
~

rr3(a).
The I 942 Revenue A.ct 286 amended paragraph ( 5) to relate cost
basis valuation in the ·case of property transmitted at death to the
applicable valuation date for estate tax purposes in the event the
executor exercises the optional valuation privilege under section
8 I I (j ) of the code.
281

313 U.S. 28, 61 S. Ct. 757 (1941).
For references in connection with the case, see note 171, supra.
~s 313 U.S. 247, 61 S. Ct. 878 (1941).
84
;i
324 U.S. 1, 65 S. Ct. 469 (1945).
285
313 U.S. 428, 61 S. Ct. 971 (1941).
286
Sec. 144(a), amending I.R.C., § II3(a)(5).
282
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The 1942 Revenue Act 287 also amended paragraph (3) of section
rr3(a) to make clear that gifts in trust are subject to the cost basis
provisions applicable generally under paragraph ( 2) to property acquired by gift.

( c) Capital gains and losses 288

(r) The basic pattern (I.R.C., § rr7). The 1942 Revenue Act 289
substantially modified section· 1 r 7. The section as so amended recognizes two classes of capital assets: (a) short term-held for not more
than six months; (b) long term-held for more than six months.
In the case of individual taxpayers roo% of gain or loss is taken
into account on the sale or exchange of short-term capital assets and
50% on long-term capital assets; a net capital loss is deductible against
ordinary income only to the extent of $moo; however unused net
capital loss may be carried forward to be applied against net capital
gains and against $ rooo of ordinary income in each of the succeeding
five years; the use of an alternative tax separately computed in case of
a net long-term capital gain has the effect of limiting the tax to 25%
of the total gain on long-term transactions.
In the case of corporate taxpayers the full amount of gain or loss
is taken into account on the sale and exchange of either short-term
or long-term capital assets; capital losses are deductible only against
capital gain but a five-year carry-over is allowed for net capital loss.
The use of an alternative tax with respect to net long-term capital
gain limits the effective tax rate to 2 5 % of the total gain on long term
transactions.
(2) Definition of "capital assets"' [I.R.C., § II7 (a)(1)]. The
1942 Revenue Act2° 0 amended subsection (a) to exclude from the
capital asset category "real property used in the trade or business of
the taxpayer."
(3) Gains and losses from the sale or exchange of certain property used in the trade or business and from the involuntary conversion
of such property and of capital assets [I.R.C., § u7(j) J. The r942
Revenue Act 291 added subsection (j) to provide that if the recognized
Sec. 143(b), amending I.R.C., § 113{a){3).
See generally MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME, rev. ed., 115-121 (1945); Kent,
"The Question of Taxing Capital Gains-The Case for Taxation," 7 LAW AND
CoNTEM. PROB. 194 (1940); Nelson, "The Case Against Taxation," id. 208.
289
Sec. 150, amending various parts of I.R.C., § II].
290
Sec. 151{a), amending I.R.C., § u7{a)(1).
291 Sec. 15 I {b), amending I.R.C., § I I 7 ·
287

288
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gains f~om such transactions { where property held for more than six
months) exceed the losses, they are to. be treated as long term capital
gains and losses so that the net gain is given the benefit of the alternative tax applicable to net long-term capital gains. On the other hand,
any net loss by reference to these transactions is made deductible as
an ordinary loss. This amendment marks an important concession to
taxpayers by giving them with respect to certain transactions the benefit
of the limited tax rate in the case of a gain and the benefit of an ordinary deduction in case of loss. It will be noted that one of the results
of this amendment is to overcome the effect of the Supreme Court's
decision in Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co.202 which
had held that, an involuntary conversion was not a sale or. exchange
and that gain thereon was taxable as ordinary gain.
(4) Gain or loss upon the cutting of timber [I.R.C., § I r7(k) J.
The r 943 Revenue Act 293 amended this section by adding subsection
(k} which authorizes a taxpayer to elect to treat the cutting of timber
( for sale or for use in his trade or business) as a sale or exchange of
such timber cut during the taxable year.

7. Corporate Distributions and Reorganizations 29
(a) Stock dividends [I.R.C., § u5(f)(r)]

4,

Helvering v. Griffiths 295-taxpayer held not taxable on value of
common stock received by him as dividend on his common stock holding. The majority based its decision on the intent of Congress and
found no occasion to reconsider Eisner v. Macomber.296
292

313 U.S. 247, ()1 S. Ct. 878 (1941).
Sec. 127(a), amending I.R.C., § u7.
29
4, On the general subject, see MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME, rev. ed., c. 2 (1945).
On the question of what are corporate "earnings or profits" within the meaning of I.R.C., § II 5 (a), see Paul, "Ascertainment of 'Earnings or Profits' for the
Purpose of Determining the Taxability of Corporate Distributions," 5 l HARV. L.
REV. 40 (1937); Reno, "Earnings a!ld Profits," 80 J. OF AccoUNTANCY 207
(1945); Rudick, "'Dividends' and 'Earnings or Profits' Under the Income Tax Law:
Corporate Non-Liquidating Distributions," 89 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 865 (1941).
295
318 U.S. 371, 63 S. Ct. 636 (1943), no~ed in 31 CAL. L. REv. 302 (1943),
43 Cot. L. REv. 537 (1943), 41 MICH~ L. REv. 1208 (1943), 91 UNIV. PA. L.
REv. 770 (1943).
296 See MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME, rev. ed., 44-47 (1945); Altman, "Effect of
the Recent Stock Dividend Decisions," 21 TAXES 25 l (1943); Rottschaefer, "Present Taxable Status of Stock Dividends in Federal Law," 28 MINN. L. REV. 106, 163
(1944). For earlier discussions, see James, "The Present Status of Stock Dividends
Under the Sixteenth Amendment;' 1 6 UNiv. Cm. L. REv. 215 (1939); Mertens,
"Recent Income Tax Trends in Stock Dividend Cases," 27 CoRN. L. Q. 449 (1942).
293
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H elvering v. Sprouse 297-taxpayer who owned voting common
stock in a corporation which had only voting and non-voting common
stock outstanding held not taxable on a dividend of non-voting common stock which was issued to holders of both classes of stock; dividends found not to disturb the relationship previously existing amongst
all the stockholders.208
Strassburger v. Commissioner 200-taxpayer who was sole stockholder of corporation held not taxable on a dividend in non-voting
preferred; distribution resulted in no change in stockholder's net interest in corporation.800

(b) Tax-free corporate reorganizations 801 [I.R.C., § II2(g)]
See the following decisions which involved "creditors' reorganizations" and which arose under the law prior to the 1942 amendment
referred to below: Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co.; 802
Marlborough Investment Co. v. Commissioner;'8° 8 Palm Springs
Holding Corp. v. Commissioner; 804 Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated Corp.; 805 Helvering v. Cement Investors, Inc. 800
201

318 U.S. 604, 63 S. Ct. 791 (1943).
See the articles by Altman and Rottschaefer, cited note 296, supra.
299
318 U.S. 604, 63 S. Ct. 791 (1943).
800
See the articles by Altman and Rottschaefer, cited note 296, supra.
801
On the general subject, see MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME, rev. ed., c. 4 (1945);
PAUL, SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION, 2d series, 200, 248 (1938);
Brookes, "The Continuity of Interest Test in Reorganization-A Blessing or a Curse,"
34 CAL. L. REv. I (1946); Fahey, "Income Tax Definition of 'Reorganization,'"
39 CoL. L. REv. 933 (1939); Fahey, "'Relief' Provisions in the Revenue Act of
1943,'' 53 YALE L. J. 459 (1944); Griswold, "'Securities' and 'Continuity of Interest,'" 58 HARV. L. REv. 705 (1945); Hendricks, "Federal Income Tax: Definition of Reorganization,'' 45 HARV. L. REv. 648 (1932); Hendricks, "Developments
in the Taxation of Reorganizations," 34 CoL. L. REv. i 198 (1938); Hendricks,
"Federal Income Tax: Further Comments on Reorganizations,'' 86 UNiv. PA. L. REV.
602 (1938); Kuder, "Tax Definition of Reorganization: Mergers and Consolidations,'' 40 MICH. L. REV. 541 (1942); Sandburg, "The Income Tax Subsidy to
'Reorganization,'" 38 CoL. L. REv. 98 (1938); Silverson, "The Meaning of Le
Tulle v. Scofield,'' 18 TAXES 492 (1940); comment, 49 YALE L. J. 1079 (1940).
For discussion of the "business purpose" idea, as first developed in Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 55 S. Ct. 266 (1935), see Flack, "Where Tax Saving is
Behind the B:gsiness Purpose,'' 23 TAXES 910 (1945); Holzman, "Ten Years of the
Gregory Case,'' 79 J. OF AccouNTANCY 215 (1945).
802
315 U.S. 179, 62 S. Ct. 540 (1942).
808
315 U.S. 189, 62 S. Ct. 537 (1942).
30
' 315 U.S. 185, 62 S. Ct. 544 (1942).
m 315 U.S. 194, 62 S. Ct. 546 (1942).
806
316 U.S. 527, 62 S. Ct. n25 (1942).
298
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The 1943 Revenue Act8° 7 added paragraph (10) to section II2(b)
to provide for the non,,.recognition of gain or loss on transfers pursuant
to court orders in certain receivership and bankruptcy proceedings.808

(c) Distributions pursuant to ta~-free reorganization having effect
of taxable dividend [I.R.C., § 112(c)]
Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford 309--<:.ash distributed pursuant
to a plan of recapitalization that came within the statutory· definition
of reorganization held taxable as ordinary income and not as capital
gain since such distributions had "the effect of the distribution of a
taxable dividend." 310
8. Taxable Persons

(a) Corporations 811
(I) Recognition of corporate entity
. Moline Properties, Inc. v. United Statesu2-gain on sale of real

1

property owned by corporation taxable to it and not to its sole stockholder; corporation regarded as separate taxable entity.818 _
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.314--<:.orporation held taxable
on gain from sale of corporate assets where corporation entered into
initial negotiations with respect to sale but thereafter distributed assets
in liquidation to stockholders who then completed the sale.315
Sec. 121(a); amending I.R.C., § 112(b).
sos See Darrell, "Creditors' Reorganizations and the Federal Income Tax," 57
HARv. L. REv. 1009 (1944); Fahey, "'Relief' Provisions in the Revenue Act of
1943," 53 YALE L. J. 459 (1944); 51 YALE L. J. 128 (1941).
.
309
325 U.S. 283, 65 S. Ct. 1157 (1945).
310
See Darrell, "The Scope of Commissioner· v. Bedford's Estate," 24 TAXES
266 (1946); notes in 45 CoL. L. REv. 799 (1945), I TAX L. REv. I I I (1945).
- On the related question of taxation under I.R.C., § 11 5 (g) distributions in redemption of stock, see Gutkin and Beck, "Stock Redemption as Taxable Events under
.Section 115(g): The Impressionistic Test," So J. OF AccoUNTANCY 285 (1945).
811 On the general treatment of partnerships, see Rabkin and Johnson, "The
Partnership under the Federal Tax Laws," 55 HARV. L. REv. 909 (1942).
812
319 U.S . .if-36, 63
Ct. II32 (1943).
.
8111 See Cleary, "The Corporate Entity in Tax Cases," l TAX L. REv. 3 (1945);
Case, "Disregard of Corporate Entity in Federal Taxation-The Modern Approach,"
30 VA. L. REv. 398 (1944); Harrar, "The Function of the Entity in Federal Income
Taxation: Recent Developments," 25 MINN. L. REv. 189 (1941).
314
324 U.S. 331, 65 S. Ct. 707 (1945).
315 See note, Johnson, "Corporation and Stockholder-Dividends in Kind," 1
TAX :i:,. REV. 86 (1945).
307
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(2) Consolidated returns by affiliated corporations (I.R.C., § r4r)
The r942 Revenue Acts 16 extensively amended section r4r to restore to affiliated corporations the privilege of filing consolidated returns for the purposes of the corporate normal and surtaxes as well
as the excess profits tax.

(b) Husband-wife 811
(r) Family partnership. Commissioner v. Tower 818 and Lusthaus
819
'V. Commissioner -facts in these companion cases essentially the
same; majority sustained Tax Court's determination that husband
taxable on all of partnership earnings despite wife's capital interest in
partnership, where husband controlled the business, wife took ~o part
in management or operation and her capital share therein was derived
by way of gift from husband.820
(2) Community income. Commissioner v. Harmon 321-notwithstanding that taxpayer and his wife elected to come under Oklahoma
optional community property law, taxpayer held taxable on all the
316

Sec. l 59(a), amending I.R.C., § 141.
On the taxation of family trusts, see the treatment of trusts below.
On the taxation of assigned income, see MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME, rev. ed.,
283-305 (1945); comment, Barrett, "Taxing Assigned Income Under Helvering v.
Horst," 29 CAL. L. REv. 495 (1941); Bowden, "Assignments of Income Reconsidered," 20 TAXES 67 (1942); Groves and Copperman, "Assignment of Earned Income," 17 TAXES 719 (1939); Shattuck, "Taxation of Deflected Income--The Horst
and Eubank Cases," 13 RocKY MT. L. REv. 2£0 (1941); Surrey, "Assignments of
Income and Related Devices: Choice of the Taxable Person," 33 CoL. L. REV-. 791
(1933); Surrey, "The Supreme Court and the Income Tax: Some Implications of the
Recent Decisions," 35 ILL. L. REv. 779 (1941).
On the general subject of tax avoidance, see PAui., SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION, 2d series, 254 (1938); Altman, "Recent Developments in Income
Tax Avoidance," 29 ILL. L. REv. 154 (1934); Angell, "Tax Evasion and Tax
Avoidance," 38 CoL. L. REv. 80 (1938); Buck, "Income Tax Evasion and Avoidance: The Deflection of Income," 23 VA. L. REv. 107, 265 (1936, 1937); Rudick,
"The Problem of Personal Income Tax Avoidance," 7 LAw AND CoNTEM. PRoB. 243
(1940).
us 327 U.S. 280, 66 S. Ct. 532 (1946).
819
327 U.S. 293, 66 S. Ct. 539 (1946).
820
See Barkan, "Family Partnerships and the Income Tax," 44 MicH. L. REV.
179 (1945); Elrod, "Husband and Wife or 'Family' Partnerships," 20 IND. L. J. 65
(1944); Jones, "Family Partnerships-Their Creation and Validity," 25 TAXES 252
(1947); Olson, "Family Partnerships," 24 TAXES 743 (1946); Paul, "Partnerships
in Tax Avoidance," 13 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 121 (1945); Rabkin and Johnson, "The
Partnership under the Federal Tax Laws," 55 HARV. L. REv. 909 (1942); Veron,
"Taxation of the Income of Family Partnerships," 59 HARV. L. REv. 209 (1945).
821
323 U.S. 44, 65 S. Ct. 103 (1944).
811
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income derived from his earnings and from his separate property. In
reaching this result the majority distinguished Poe v. Seaborn on
ground that in the latter case the community status was created by law
and was not derived from agreement of the parties.822

(c) Trusts 828

,

(r) The basic statutory pattern (I.R.C., §§ I6I-I63). The r942
Revenue Act 824 amended section r62 to require distributions out of
other than income to be treated as income distributions under certain
circumstan.ces. This act further amended this section to insure taxa822
·
After this decision the Oklahoma law was revised so as to eliminate the elective
featu!e· H.B. 218 was approved April 28, 1945 and became effective July 26, 1945.
In I.T. 3782, INT. REv. BuLL. 1946-4-12239, the bureau ruled that community
property interests under the new statute would be recognized for tax purposes. For
a discussion of the earlier statute, see Daggett, "The Oklahoma Community• Property
Act-A Comparative Study," 2 LA. L. REv. 575 (1940).
For discussions of the community property problem under the income tax law,
see MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME, rev. ed., 305-313 (1945); Altman, "Community
Property in Peril," 19 TAXES 262 (1941); Latcham, "Invasions of the Community
Property Income Tax Privileges," 20 WASH. L. REv. 44 (1945); Maggs, "Community Property and the Federal Income Tax," 14 CAL. L. REV. 351, 441 (1926);
Mitchell, "Federal Taxation in Recent Contact with California Community Property," 14 So. CAL. L. REv. 390 (1941); Oliver, "Community Property and the
Taxation of Family Income," 20 TEx. L. REv. 532 (1942); Pedersen, "Application
of Federal Income, Estate and Gift Tax Laws to Community Property," 45 MICH. L.
REv. 409 (1947); Ray, "Proposed Changes .in Federal Taxation of Community
Property: Income Tax," 30 CAL. L. REv; 397 (1942). See also the references cited
in note 29, supra, in connection with the 1942 amendment of the estate tax law.
On the general question of compulsory joint returns of husband and wife, see
Altman, "Community Property: Avoiding Avoidance by Adoption in the Revenue
Act," 16 TAX. MAG. 138 (1938); Bruton, "The Taxation of Family Income," 41
YALE L. J. 1172 (1932); Magill, ''The Federal Income Tax on the Family," 20
TEX. L. REV. 150 (1941); Paul and Havens, "Husband and Wife Under the Income Tax," 5 BRooK. L. REV. 241 (1936); Reiling, "Taxing the Income of Husband and Wife," 13 TAX. MAG. 198 (1935); comment in 49 YALE L. J. 1279
(1940); Surrey, "Family Income and Federal Taxation," 24 TAXES 980 (1946).
828
On the use of the trust device as a means of minimizing family income taxes,
see Buck, "Income Tax Evasion and Avoidance: The Deflection of Income," 23 VA.
L. REv. 107, 265 (1936, 1937); James, "Family Trusts and Feel.era! Taxes," 9
UNiv. CHI. L. REv. 427 (1942); Jones, "Instrumentalities for Avoiding Taxes," 27
GEo. L. J. 18 (1938); Tremper, "Single v. Multiple Trusts," 17 TAXES 463
(1939); Leaphart, "The Use of the Trust to Escape the Imposition of Federal Income and Estate Taxes," 15 CoRN. L. Q. 587 (1930); Warren, "The Reduction of
Income Taxes Through the Use of Trusts," 34 M1cH. L. REv. 809 (1936); comment, "Multiple Trusts and the minimization of Federal Taxes," ·40 CoL. L. REv.
309 ( 1940). See also the articles cited in the last paragraph of note 317, supra.
824
Sec. 111(c), amending I.R.C., § 162.
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tion to beneficiaries of distribution of trust income not currently distributable during the taxable year of the estate or trust; this amendment was designed to end practice of avoiding tax on beneficiary by
making trust income distributable shortly after close of taxable year of
trust.s25
( 2) Deductions for contributions to charities [ I.R.C., § 162 (a)].
Merchants National Bank of Boston v. Commissioner 826-trustee not
allowed charitable deduction against capital where charity's interest
in corpus of trust was subject to trustee's power to.invade for benefit
of life tenant and hence the gain was not "permanently set aside"
for charitable use. See reference to same case under "Estate TaxDeductions," above.
(3) Taxation of trust income to settlor on ownership or control
theory 827 [I.R.C., § 166, 22(a)]. In the celebrated case of Helvering
v. Clifford 828 the Supreme Court held that income from a short-term
(five-year) irrevocable trust was taxable to the settlor-taxpayer under
section 22 (a) of the code, where the taxpayer's wife was named as
benefidary, the taxpayer named himself as trustee and in his capacity
as trustee had discretionary power either to distribute the income currently or to accumulate the same, as well as very wide powers of
management over the trust property.829 The case presented an extraordinary instance of statutory construction in that it pointed to a much
more inclusive taxation of trust income to the settlor under the "shotgun" language of section 22 (a) than Congress had indicated in the
specific and restricted language of section 166 which, covers cases
where the settlor has power at any time, either alone or in conjunction
825

See Rabkin and Johnson, "Trust and Beneficiary Under the Income Tax,"
TAX L. REV. 11,7 (1945).
Reference was made earlier in the text to the I 942 amendment which requires
the beneficiary of an annuity trust to treat amounts received from such a trust as
income to the extent that they are acually paid out of income of the trust. 'See the
references cited in notes I 8 2-1 84, supra.
826
320 U.S. 256, 64 S. Ct. rn8 (1943).
327
On the use generally of the trust as a tax avoidance device, see the articles
cited in note 323, supra.
828
309 U.S. 331, 60 S. Ct. 554 (1940).
829
For excellent earlier treatments of the Clifford case, see Pavenstedt, "The
Broadened Scope of Section 22(a): The Evolution of the Clifford Doctrine," 51
YALE L. J. 213 (1941); Ray, "The Income Tax on Short Term and Revocable
Trusts," 53 HARV. L. REv. 1322 (1940). See also the comments in 38 M1cH. L.
REv. 885 (1940), 27 CoRN. L. Q. 133 (1941).
I
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with any person not having a substantial adverse interest,380 to revest
in himself title to the trust corpus.
The ramifications of the Clifford doctrine have constituted a major
aspect of income tax litigation during the period under review. 881 The
elasticity of the "substantial ownership" idea and its unsuspected
reaches are revealed in the host of decisions that claim a Clifford
ancestry. Viewed as ~ whole the progeny spawned by the Clifford
case reveal the following major trends:
(a) The three factors that have emerged as the significant criteria
of "substantial· ownership" are the following: (I) reversion to the
settlor at the end of a relatively short term; ( 2) retention by the
settlor, in whatever capacity, of a power to control the distribution of
the income or the corpus; (3) retention by the settlor, in whatever
capacity, of a large measure of administrative control over the trust
property.
(b) Any one of the significant factors pointing to substantial
ownership is sufficient to warrant taxation of the settlor, i.e., it is not
necessary to show a combination of all the significant factors.
The large areas of doubt and uncertainty respecting the application of the Clifford rule led the Treasury to issue on December 29,
1945, its highly important Treasury Decision 5488 382 which ,had the
effect of amending Regulations II I by adding section 29.22 ( a )-2 I
thereto.338 Purporting to state an authoritative interpretation of the
Clifford doctrine, this amendment in the way it details the treatment"
of the subject and posits specific rules and tests can scarcely be distinguished from an act of Congress amending the code. In general it
330

See Brunner, "Substantial Adverse Intere;ts," 21 TAXEs 385 (1943).
See Case, "The Circuit Courts of Appeals Examine the Clifford Doctrine,"
7 Mo~ L. REv. 201 (1943); note, Higgins, "Recent Developments in the Taxation
of Short-Term Irrevocable Trusts," 30 GEo. L. J. 656 (1942); James, "Family
Trusts and Federal Taxes," 9 UNiv. CHI. L. REv. 427 (1942); Magill, "What Shall
be Done With the Clifford Case?" 45 CoL. L. REv. I I I (1945); Polisher, "The
Family Trust-Its Income Tax Fate," 49 DICK. L. REv. 33 (1945); comment in IO
UNIV. CHI. L. REV, 488 (1943).
882
INT. REV. BULL. 1946-2-12210.
838
See Guterman, "The New Clifford Regulations," I TA.ic L. REY. 379
(1946); Pavenstedt, "The Treasury Legislates: The Distortion of the Clifford Rule,"
2 TAX L. REv. 7 (1946); Eistenstein, "The Clifford Regulations and the Heavenly
- City of Legislative Intention," 2 TAX L. REV. 327 (1947); Pavenstedt, "The Clifford Regulations-A Reply to Mr. Eisenstein," 2 TAX. L. REV. 476 (1947);
Polisher, "The New Trust Regulations Under Clifford Doctrine," 2+ TAXES 352
(1946f; Smith, "How New Regulations Affect the Clifford Case," 24 TAXES 624
(1946).
.
881

.
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may be said that this amendment of the Regulations capitalizes upon
the previously mentioned trends evident in the judicial decisions that
followed in the wake of the Clifford case and bottoms the settler's
liability on one or more of the three factors of substantial ownership
referred to above, i.e., reversion after a relatively short term, control
over distribution of corpus or income, or administrative control. A
trust with reversion to the settler within ten years is considered a
short term trust and the income thereof made taxable to the settler
regardless of any other element of control. But even a fifteen year
trust is taxable to the settler if certain specified elements of administrative control are retained. On the other hand retention of administrative control which is exercisable primarily for the benefit of the
settler rather than the beneficiaries is sufficient to make the income
taxable to the settler regardless of the term of the trust. Likewise
the power in the settler to determine or control beneficial enjoyment
of income or corpus makes the trust income taxable to him, r~gardless
of th~ term of the trust. These illustrative cases are cited simply to
give some indication of both the scope and detail of Treasury Decision 5488 and to emphasize the necessity of a careful examination
of the same.
Whether the amended Regulations will stand up under judicial
scrutiny remains to be seen.884 The general theory of Treasury Decision 5488 as well as its specific treatment of some types of cases are
well authenticated by decisions interpreting the Clifford case. The
validity of some of the detailed treatment and specific standards stated
therein is open to question and will undoubtedly be the subject of considerable litigation.834 a
( 4) Taxation of trust income to settlor on a benefit theory 885
884

See the articles cited in note 333, supra.
Sec. 29.22 (a)-21 of Regulations II as amended by T.D. 5567, approved
June 30, 1947. In conformity with the Federal Administrative Procedure Act notice
of the proposed further amendment was given in the Federal Register, January 28,
1947. For the text of this section of the regulations as most recently amended see
1947-2 P.H. FED. TAX SERv., § 15,312. The general effect of T.D. 5567 is to
liberalize the rules stated in T.D. 5488.
885 Prior to the I 942 amendments the husband-settlor of a trust was held taxable, on a benefit theory under § 22(a), on the income used to discharge an obligation to pay alimony to a divorced wife where, under local law, the transfer in trust
did not mark a final discharge of the obligation of support. See Cahn, "Local Law in
Federal Taxition," 52 YALE L. J. 799 (1943); Cardozo, "Federal Taxes and the
Radiating Potencies of State Court Decisions." 51 YALE L. J. 783 (1942); Paul,
"Five Years with Douglas v. Willcuts," 53 HARV. L. REv. I (1939); Tye, "Federal
334 a
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[I.R.C., §§ 167, 22(a)]. Helvering v. Stuart 886--settlor held taxable
on income of trust to extent that such income, in the discretion of persons not having an interest substantially adverse to settlor, could be
applied to discharge his obligation to maintain and support his legal
dependents. 887
In failing to limit the settlor's tax liability in the case of such a
discretionary trust tq the income actually used for his benefit through
the discharge of his family obligations, the Stuart case seemed to go
further than was required by a reasonable regard for the prevention
of tax avoidance. Accordingly Congress in the 1943 Revenue Act 88 8'
amended section 167 of the code by adding thereto subsection ( c)
which provides that in the case of a discretionary trust for support and
maintenance the income therefrom shall not be taxed to the settlor on
a benefit theory except to the extent that the income is applied or distributed for the support or mairitenance of the settlor's dependents.
This amendment appears to make clear that the maintenance and support trust is now controlled by section 167 rather than by the general
-definition of income under section 22(a).
(5) Employee's trusts (I.R.C., § 165). The 194-2 RevenueAct 889
extensively amended this section in order to state with much greater
precision the conditions, necessary to establish the tax-exempt status
of a trust forming part of a stock bonus, pension or profit-sharing plan.
Seen in broad perspective the purpose of the amendment was to make
· Taxation of Alimony Trusts," 19 TAXES 19 (1941); comments in 35 ILL. L. REV.
332 (1940); 38 ,MICH. L. REv. 1285 (1940); 19 N.C. L. REv. 94 (1940). Under
the 1942 act [ § 12o(c), amending supplement E of chapter l by adding I.R.C., §
171] income from an alimony trust is now taxable to the wife, and the husbandsettlor is relieved from liability for tax on the same. See Gornick, "Alimony and the
Income Tax: Background and Effect of the Provisions in the Revenue Act of 1942,"
29 CoRN. L. Q. 28 (1943). This amendment conforms to the other 1942 amendments ~axing periodic alimony or separate maintenance payments to the wife and giving the husband a deduction for such payments. See the references cited in notes
175-177, supra.
·
, On the taxation to the settlor of income from an insurance trust, under I.R.C.,
§ 167(a)(3), see Smith, "Federal Taxation of Insurance Trusts," 40 M1cH. L. REV.
207· (1941). •
•
886
317 U.S. 654, 63 S. Ct. 1044 (1942).
,
1187
Ser. MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME, rev. ed., 275-280 (1945); Gute'rman, "The
Federal Income Tax and Trusts for Support-the Stuart Case and Its Aftermath," 57
HARV. L. REV. 479 (1944); comments in 29 CoRN. L. Q. 128 (1943); 52 YALE
L. J. 662 (1943); 8,7 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 337 (1939).
388
Sec. 134(a), amending I.R.C., § 167•
889
.
Sec. 162(a), amending I.R.C., § 165.
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clear that the tax-immunity privilege in the case of a trust of this kind
rests on a policy of favoring plans which are designed to benefit employees as a whole as distinguished from plans granting preferred
privileges by way of deferred compensation to small classes of employees in the higher-salary groups.840 Stated in another way, Congress
in adopting the I942 amendment employed the income tax law as a
vehicle for inducing employers to conform to federal standards in the
establishment of employee-benefit plans. Mention has previously been •
made under other headings sn of the related I 942 amendments having to do with inclusions in the employee's gross income of contributions paid by an employer to employee-benefit plans and with deductions by employer~ for such contributions. A common element of
legislative policy gives a pattern of unity and consistency to these
related amendments.

(D) The Role of the United States Tax Court
Under the I942 Revenue Act 842 the tax tribunal formerly known
as the United States Board of Tax Appeals was redesignated as the
United States Tax Court. This was a formal change unaccompanied
by any revision of the statutory scheme relating to the tribuna1's jurisdiction.
A much more significant event in the elevation of this tax tribunal's
status was the decision in the celebrated case of Dobson v. Commissioner,348 where the Supreme Court took occasion to delineate ·the role
of the Tax Court in the system of federal tax administration artd to
announce a policy that pointed to a drastically curtailed ju9-icial review of the Tax Court's determinations/" Since I926 the statute
defining the jurisdiction of the former Board of Tax Appeals and its
successor, the present Tax Court, has authorized review by the circuit
courts of appeals and in turn by the Supreme Court, for errors of law
uo See Babb, "Pension and Profit-Sharing Trusts," 1945 Wis. L. REV. 563;
Cann, "How the Commissioner Handles Pension Plans," 23 TAXES 918 (1945); Rice,
"Employee Trusts Under the Revenue Act of 1942," 20 TAXES 721 (1942); Spindell,
"Current Problems Regarding Penison and Profit-Sharing Trusts," 23 TAXES 161
(1945).
841
See the references cited in notes 187 and 239, supra.
842
Sec. 504(a), amending I.R.C., § I 100.
m 320 U.S. 489, 64.S. Ct. 239 (1943).
844
See Paul, "Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of Law and Fact,"
57 HARv. L. REv. 753 (1944).
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in the tax tribunal's determinations. What was new in the Dobson
opinion was the articulation by the Supreme· Court of its intention to
limit the "question of law" concept and thereby <::onstrict the scope
of judicial review to a ~arrower area than was recognized in the preDobson era.
The specific question in the Dobson case was whether the Tax
Court had erred in applying the so-called "tax benefit rule" with re• spect to recoupment by a taxpayer of a loss item which had previously
served as the basis of an income tax deduction. Without committing
itself OIJ. the merits of the tax benefit rule, the Supreme Court held
that the rule involved essentially a matter of income tax accounting,
that such a matter of accounting was'not strictly a question of law, that
the Tax Court was competent to adopt the tax benefit rule and that
the reviewing courts were precluded from substituting their own conclusions on the soundness of the tax benefit theory.845
That the Dobson, case was not a "fly-by-night" decision and that
the Supreme Court has taken upon itself in a serious way the task of
delimiting judicial review of the Tax Court's determinations is evident from its subsequent ciecisions. 846 It is also evident that the Supreme Court's attitude has made a distinct impression upon the circuit
courts of appeals. 847
For a compilation and analysis of the cases dealing with the application of the Dobson doctrine the reader is referred to a comment
recently appearing in this Review.348 For the purpose at hand it is
sufficient to call attention to the following Supreme Court decisions
chosen for their significance as follow-ups to the Dobson case: Commissioner v. Heininger; 349 Commissioner Scottish American Invest-

v.

845

See Paul's article, cited in note 344, supra.
See the comment, "Judicial Review of Determination of United States· Tax
Court-The Rule of the Dobson Case," 45 M1cH. L. REV. 192 (1946); also Gordon,
"Reviewability of Tax Court Decisions," 2 TAX L. REv. 171 (1946-1947); Nelson,•
''The 'Dobson' Rule Reaffirmed by the 'Kelley' Case," 24 TAXES 104 (1946).
847
" The Dobson decision was handed down in 1943. Since that time the Supreme Court applied the rule of the Dobson case once again in 1943, six times in
1944, once in r945 and six times in 1946 to date. More informative is the application of the rule by the circuit courts of appeals. There it was applied in forty-four
instances in 1943, in twenty-four cases in 1944, and in twenty-five cases in 1946
to date." 45 M1cH. L. REv: 192 at 193 (1946).
848
45 M1cH. L. REv. 192 (1946).
349
320 U.S. 467, 64 S. Ct. 249 (1943).
846
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855

ment Co.; 850 Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner; 851 Commissioner v.
Wemyss; 862 Security Flour Mills v. Commissioner; 858 Commissioner
v. Flowers; m The John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner; 856 Commissioner v. Tower. 856
· A study of these cases makes clear that the recent developments
have not clarified but rather obscured the distinction between questions of law and questions of fact, that questions of statutory construction normally regarded as questions of law have been assimilated into
the question of fact category for purposes of judicial review, that there
is a good deal of confusion and uncertainty within the Supreme Court
itself 857 on the proper application of the Dobson idea and that the
results tend to confirm the conclusion of competent observers that the
appellate courts will probably review those determinations of the Tax
Court which they wish to review. 858 A further word on this matter appears in the final part of this review.

III
BrnLio.GRAPHICAL NoTE

The writer's purpose in this part is to call attention to some major
bibliographical items as well as to refer the reader to sources on some
phases of federal taxation not dealt with in the preceding part.
Randolph Paul's Federal Estate and Gift Taxation, 850 published
in two volumes in 1942, marked a major contribution to the body of
tax literature. 860 This superlative work has now been brought up to
date with the publication of the 1946 Supplement which measures up
850

323 U.S. n9, 65 S. Ct. 169 (1944).
325 U.S. 365, 65 S. Ct. 1232 (1945).
852
324 U.S. 303, 65 S. Ct. 652 (1945).
358
321 U.S. 281, 64 S. Ct. 596 (1944).
854
326 U.S. 465, 66 S. Ct. 250 (1946).
855
326 U.S. 521, 66 s. Ct. 299 (1946).
356
327 U.S. 280, 66 S. Ct. 532 (1946).
857
See for instance the division within the Court in the John Kelley Co. case,
cited note 3 55, supra.
858 For critical discussions of the Dobson doctrine, see Eisenstein, "Some Iconoclastic Reflections on Tax Administration," 58 HARV. L. REv. 477 (1945); Griswold, ''Need for a Court of Tax Appeals," 57 HARV. L. REv. II53 (1944); Paul,
"Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of Law and Fact," 57 HARV. L. REv.
753 (1953); Tyler, "Commissioner v. Wheeler-A Footnote to the Dobson Case,"
45 CoL. L. REv. 755 (1945)~
859 Little, Brown & Company, Publisher.
860
Reviewed by this writer in 40 MICH. L. REV. 856 (1942).
851
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to the high standard set by the first two volumes and includes excellent' treatments of the important changes made by the 1942 Revenue
Act.
Roswell Magill's Taxable Income,3~ 1 first published ju 1936, appeared in a revised and expanded edition in 1945. The revision has
enhanced the very fine reputation the book gained for itself in its
earlier edition. No student of the subject can afford to do without this
gem of a text.
Mertens' -Law of Federal Income Taxation 862 which appeared in a
revised and expanded edition in 1942 (12 volumes), and which is kept
up-to-date through the use of cumulative pocket supplement parts,
continues to be the definitive work on the subject. This text combines·
comprehensive coverage, thorough scholarship and careful analysis.
Robert Montgomery's Federal Taxes on Estates, Trusts and
Gifts,863 revised annually and currently in its 1946-1947 edition, is
a very useful piece of work. The same is true of his two volume Federal Taxes,-Corpo;ations and Partnerships,864 currently in its 19461947 edition.
Two excellent series of monographs have been prepared and published by the Practicing Law Institute in conjunction with the Ta.xatio.n Section of the American Bar Association. The first series (pub- ·
lished in 1943-1944) is entitled "Fundamentals of Federal Taxation," and is particularly useful both as an ,introduction to the subject
and for general "refresher" purposes. The second series, "Current
Problems in Federal Taxation" (1944-1945) represents a more highly
specialized treatment of specific questions.
The period under review gave birth to a new journal devoted ex. elusively to ta+ matters. T~e first number of the Tax Law Rewew,
published by the New York Up.iversity School of Law, appeared in
1945. This scholarly publication is a welcome addition both to the
family of law reviews and to the specialized body of tax literature.
Another contribution by New York University is the publication
' by it of the Proceedings of the Annual Institute on Federal Taxation
conducted under its auspices and first inaugurated in 1942. These published proceedings are chock-full of helpful expert discussions of fed861

The Ronald Press Company, Publisher.
Callaghan & Co., Publisher.
863 The Ronald Press Company, Publisher.
864 The Ronald Press t;ompany, Publisher.
862
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eral tax problems of all kinds. The Proceedings of the I 946 Institute
cover approximately sixty subjects and total 958 pages.
The number of texts and articles devoted to the subject of estate
planning and conservation, with emphasis on the matter of tax economies, bear witness to the importance of this phase of the lawyer's job
in serving his clients.865
The larger fiscal, economic and administrative phases of federal
taxation have been the subject of renewed interest and attention. A
good deal. of critical and constructive thinking is being devoted to the
general subject of basic tax policy and to the matter of post-war reform
of the tax system in order to stimulate econo~ic enterprise, improve
tax administration and remedy the treatment of some specific problems. The matter of altering the present system of corporate taxa1165

See ALLISON, INVESTORS' TAX PLANNING (1946); CocHRAN, ScIENTIFIC
TAX REDUCTION (1937); GARWOOD, ESTATE PLANNING TO MINIMIZE TAXES
(1940); MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAXES ON ESTATES, TRUSTS AND G1FTS, 19461947, c. 1; POLISHER, EsTATE PLANNING AND ESTATE TAX SAVING (1943); RoB1NsoN, SAVING TAXES IN DRAFTING WILLS AND TRUSTS, 2d ed. (1933); Elrod, "Estate
Planning," 19 IND. L. J. 213 (1944); Evans, "Minimizing Income and Death
Taxes," 19 M1cH. ST. B. J. 590 (1940); Fillman, "Tax Planning for the Income
of a Decedent and his Estate," N.Y. Umv. FIFTH ANNUAL lNsT. ON FED. TAX: 76
(1947); Foosaner, "E&tate Planning Receives Another Set-Back," 20 TAXES 730
(1942); Foosaner, "Tax Technique in Preparation of Wills and Trusts," N.Y.
UNiv. FouRTH ANNUAL INST. ON' FED. TAX. 102 (1946), same in 24 TAXES 562
(1946); Goldman, "Estate Planning Approach," 78 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 371
(1944); Guterman, "Estate Planning in the Light of Recent Estate and Gift Tax
Decisions," N.Y. UNiv. THIRD ANNUAL INST. ON FED. TAX. I (1945); Hilgedag,
"Insurance Planning in Income and Estate Building," N.Y. UNIV. FouRTH ANNUAL
INST. ON FED. TAX. 45 (1946); Hilgedag, "Life Insurance Planni~g for Estate and
Gift Taxes," N.Y. UNiv. FIFTH ANNUAL INsT. ON FED. TAX. 25 (1947); Koster,
"Trends in Estate Planning," 78 TRUSTS AND EsTATF.S 129 (1944); Laikin, "Estate
Planning," 23 TAXES 866 (1945); Maguire, "Problems in Estate Planning," 30
CORN. L. Q. 271 (1945); Mandell, "A Tax Guide for Estate Planning," 25 TAXES
418 (1947); Marquardt, "Visual Tax Planning," 82 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 492
(1946); Morehead, "How Life Insurance Helps Conserve Estates," 24 TAXES 663
(1946); Morehead, "Minimizing Estate Taxes in Drafting Wills," 19 FLA. L. J.
214 (1945), reprinted in 23 TAXES II44 (1945), continued in Morehead, "Saving
Estate Taxes and Conserving Estates by Properly Planned Life Insurance," 20 FLA.
L. J. '9 ( l 946) ; Morehead, "The Effect on Estate Planning of Effective Business
Organization," N.Y. UNiv. FIFTH ANNUAL INST. ON FED. TAX 120 (1947); Powell,
"Common Oversights in Methods for Estate Tax Minimization," N.Y. UNiv.
FouRTH ANNUAL INST. ON FED. TAX. 133 (1945); Shepherd and Pruyn, "Some
Federal Tax Aspects of Will Draftsmanship," 25 TAXES 433 (1947); Trachtman,
"Estate Planning," CuRRENT PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAXATION, published by Practicing Law Inst. and Sec. of Taxation of A.B.A. (1945); Weeks, "Basic Tax Problems in Estate Planning," 8 TEX. ~- J. 71 (1945).
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tion in order to eliminate or mitigate the discriminatory multiple taxation of corporate earnings is seen to be an important part of any postwar tax program. For excellent treatme~ts of these broader aspects of
federal taxation, see Roswell Magill's The Impact of Federal Taxes, 866
published in 1943, and Randolph Paul's Taxation for Prosperity 861
which at the time of this writing is just off the press. Other useful
discussions of this general character are referred to in the note below.868

IV
GENERAL SUMMARY

The revenue legislation enacted by Congress during the period
under review may be broken down into two parts, namely, (a) the provisions peculiarly attributable to the war emergency and (b) the more
or less permanent changes made in the basic tax law. In the first category may be placed the extraordinary increases in income tax rates, the
enactment of the excess profits tax law, the 'provisions for amortization or accelerated depreciation of war plants and the deductions authorized for war losses. The advent of the post-war era has already
resulted in some reduction of income tax rate~, and it is not unlikely
that further reductions will soon be made.868a The excess profits tax law
is no longer effective, although the problems generated by it will con866

Columbia University Press.
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Publishers (1947).
868
GRoVEs, PRODUCTION, JoBs AND TAXES (1944); GROVES, PosT-WAR TAXATION AND EcoNOMIC PROBLEMS (1946); RuML-AND SoNNE, F1scAL AND MoNETARY
PoucY, Planning Pamphlet No. 35, Natl. Planning Assn. (1944); PosTWAR FEDERAL
TAX PLAN FOR HIGH EMPLOYMENT, prepared by the Research Committee of the
Committee for Economic Development; THE TwIN 81T1ES PLAN, PosTWAR TAXES,
Twin Cities Research Bureau, Inc. (1944); THE PosTWAR CoRPORATION TAX
STRUCTURE, a study published by the Division of Tax Research of the U.S. Treasury
Dept. (1946).
'
Attention may also be called at this point to the highly informative and very
useful report, "Federal, State and Local Government Fiscal Relations," submitted
to the Secretary of the Treasury by a special committee designated to conduct a study
in intergovernmental fiscal relations in the United States. This report which appeared
in 1943 was published as S. Doc. No. 69, 78th Cong., 1st sess.
8683
The two attempts to date of the 80th Congress to reduce individual income
tax rates have proved abortive. H.R. I (80th Cong., 1st sess.), known as Individual
Income Tax Reduction Bill of 1947, was vetoed by the President on June 16, 1947,
and the vote in the House of Representatives on June I 7 sustained the veto. H.R.
3950 (80th Cong., 1st sess.), bearing the same title, was vetoed by the President on
July 18, 1947; the House overrode the veto the same day, but the Senate vote a few
days later was not sufficient to override.
867
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tinue to be with us for some time to come. As a matter of drafting
skill and technique the complex excess profits tax law constituted a
major legislative achievement. Questions both as to the general fairness of the law in its impact upon corporate taxpayers and as to the
fiscal worth of the excess profits tax to the government cannot be adequately answered until the processing of refund claims based on accelerated amortization, general relief and carry-back of the 1946 unused excess profits credit is completed. It may in the end appear that
Congress was more liberal than the equities of the case required.
The more or less enduring legislative achievements for the period
under review represent on the whole solid improvements in the federal
tax law. Inauguration of a large scale system of collection of income
tax at the source by the withholding method, the placing of taxpayers
on a pay-as-you-go basis, arid the introduction of simplified tax tables
and of the optional standard deduction all marked commendable revisions in the mechanics of tax collection and computation. Congress
rriay also be complimented on many of the revisions of the basic substantive law. The rewriting of the powers and insurance subsections
of the estate tax law was long overdue. The community property
amendments to the estate and gift tax laws were a desirable step forward in reducing the preferred position of the community property
states under the federal tax system. Changes in the income tax law
having to do with gross income inclusions and exclusions, such as those
relating to alimony payments, annuity trusts, and improvements by
lessees and the tax-benefit rule reflected on the whole a legislative
intention to deal sensibly and fairly with taxpayers. The same may be
said of the code revisions relating to deductions, such as the amendments authorizing deductions for non-trade or non-business expenses,
for extraordinary medical expenses, for retail sales tax regardless of
the technical legal incidence of the tax. Similarly the amendment
repealing the code provision requiring income accruals to date of death
upon the decease of a taxpayer and the amendments authorizing a
carry-back of net operating losses and liberalizing the rule with respect
to t~ accounting for deferred compensation, were concessions to taxpayers by way of relief from rigid accounting requirements. Although
it is not to be expected that any scheme for taxation of capital gains will
ever be completely satisfactory, the treatment df capital gains and
losses introduced in 1942 has probably occasioned less dissatisfaction
than the various plans previously tried by Congress.
Some of the code amendments were clearly intended to put an end
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to abuses that had resulted in tax losses to the Treasury. This was true
of the extensive revisions relating to pension trusts which had too often
been used both as a means of favoring small groups of executive employees and a flexible.device for controlling the employer's income tax
liability. The same purpose may be ascribed to the amendments.dealing with trust income generally and designed to end a system that had
placed a premium on the timing of income distributions. But in general, the revisions of the code during the period under review achieved
the purpose of clarifying the law, correcting judicial errors and mitigating the harshness of the law's impact upon taxpayers.
The developments by way of judicial interpretation confirmed
trends already evident before the war period began. Characteristic
of this trend were freedom and elasticity of interpretation, disregard
for technicalities, an eye to the revenue needs of the government and
scant sympathy for the ways of the tax-dodger. Impatience with the
technical concepts of property and contract law is evident in the decisions interpreting the estate and gift tax provisions of the code. The
treatment of income_ assignments, short term trusts, family partnerships and the Oklahoma optional community property statute all
indicate a readiness to brush form aside and to look to substance in the handling of income deflection schemes. But judicial impr.essionism and
free interpretation are not always conducive to sound tax administration and to the sense of certainty and preaictability that may reasonably be expected with respect to a matter of sueµ practical importance
as taxation. Attention may be called, for instance, to the confusion now
evident in regard to application of the_Hallock and Clifford doctrines.
Moreover, respect for the Treasury's interest in the revenues, if used
as a general guide to interpretation of the code, may furnish an occasion for the development and use of artificial carions of construction. In recent years the Supreme Court has stressed two general ideas
in the construction of the income tax law: (a) that Congress has manifested its intention of exercising to the full its constitutional power to
• tax income; (b) that deductions must be strictly construed against the
"taxpayer since they are a matter of legislative grace. Questions may be
raised as to the validity of these premises.869 In any event the use of
such shibboleths, founded on general presuppositions as to an overall
policy of Congress, often tends to obscure the real issue, namely, the
869 ·see Dean Griswolcl's protest in his comment, "An Argument Against the
' Doctrine that Deductions Should be Narrowly Construed as a Matter of Legislative
Grace," 56 HARV. L. REv. II42 (1943).
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intention and policy of Congress with respect to the specific question
under consideration and may lead to results which, measured by
standards of ordinary fairness and good judgment, do injustice to the
legislative purpose. A review of recent legislation creates the impression that in numerous instances Congress was led to amend the code
in order to correct interpretations established by judicial decisions
which were seen to bear too harshly upon taxpayers. A conspicuous
example was the 1942 amendment authorizing deductions foc nontrade or non-business. expenses. The McDonald case suggests that
even this liberalizing amendment is to be construed with unwarranted
narrowness. Fortunately, the dissenting opinion in that case offers
the hope of a more liberal construction based on the premise that
Congress has evidenced an intention of taxing only net income, a
premise which carries more weight than the notion that all deduction~
must be narrowly construed.
In expressing the above criticism the writer has reference to general trends in judicial theory and decision. He does not mean to
suggesMhat every taxpayer who is successful in getting his case before
the Supreme Court must expect an adverse decision from this tribunal.
Any such suggestion is refuted by the recent income tax decisions involving debt forgiveness, stock dividends, embezzled funds, litigation
expense deductions and depletion allowances as well as the decision
finding that the relinquishment of a power in consummation of an
earlier bona fide inter vivas transfer was not a transfer in contemplation of death for purposes of the estate tax law. The writer does mean
to suggest that the Supreme Court has committed itself to certain presuppositions and canons of construction which may tend to obscure the
merits of the taxpayer's case and to make his position unnecessarily
difficult.
In concluding this review attention may be called to some problems
and questions in need of urgent attention. Space does not permit of
the detailing of proposals for extensive code revision to correct or
clarify the treatment of many specific items.870 However, the problems
generated by the decisions in the Hallock and Clifford cases may be
singled out for special attention. It is doubtful whether the Treasury
Decisions purporting to ·state an authoritative interpretation of the
doctrine of thes<? cases constitute a final or satisfactory answer. Pro-.
870
See "Proposed Amendments to the Federal Income, Estate and Gift Tax
Laws," A Report by the Committee on Taxation of the Association of the Bar of New
York City (1946). Mr. Roswell Magill was Chairman of this Committee.
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posals for legislative treatment of these specific matters seem meritorious and deserve consideration by Congress.
Some larger questions also call for attention.· The preferred status
under th~ income tax law of citizens of community property states
should not continue to be tolerated by Congress. Surely it should be
possible to have this inequity corrected without the necessity of having
the other states resort to the clumsy and unsatisfactory expedient of substituting an exotic system of property law for systems well rooted in
their common law and statutory traditions. 371
The matter of integration of the estate and gift taxes and of correlation of these transfer taxes with the income tax continues to be a
pressing one. The decision in the Shaughnessy case marked abandonment by the Supreme Court of any attempt to correlate estate and gift
taxes in terms of mutual exclusiveness. On the other hand, a studied
e:ffort pointing toward correlation of these two taxes is evident from
the decision in the Fahs case. At present there is neither rhyme nor
reason in the inconsistent theories underlying estate, gift and income
taxation of trusts. 372 Questions may be raised as to the feasibility of
attempting a complete correlation of all three taxes. 373 But a careful
study by Congress of the whole matter might well lead to code revision pointing to greater order and consistency within the code.874
The tumultuous disorder which runs through the whole system of
federal tax administration begs for attention. Indeed to characterize
the present arrangement as a system is to indulge in an euphemism.
The Dobson case, in stating a new policy in favor of curtailed review
of the Tax Court's determinations, is best described as a bold maneuver
371

See PAuL, TAXATION FOR PROSPERITY 289-292 (1947).
For an excellent review of these inconsistencies, see Judge Magruder's opinion
in Higgins v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 1st, 1942) 129 F. (2d) 237.
'
373 See Eisenstein, "Modernizing Estate and Gift Taxes," 24 TAXES 870 (1946).
874
On the general subject, see PAUL, TAXATION FOR PROSPERITY 313-316
(1947); Altman, "Combining the Gift and Estate Taxes," 16 TAX MAG. 259 (1938);
Altman, "Integration of Gift and Estate Taxes," PRoc. NAT. TAX AssN. 416 (1939);
Altman, "Integration of the Estate and Gift Taxes," 7 LAW AND CoNTEM. PROB. 331
(1940); Eisenstein, "Are We Ready for Estate and Gift Tax Revision?" 23 TAXES
316 (1945); Eisenstein, "Modernizing Estate and Gift Taxes," 24 TAXES 870
(1946); Greenfield, "Correlation of Federal Income., Estate and Gift Taxes," 16
TEMPLE L. Q. 194 (1942); Griswold, "A Plan for the Coordination of the Income,
Estate and Gift Tax Provisions with Respect to Trusts and Other Transfers," 56
HARV. L. REV. 337 (1942); Griswold, "Co-ordinating Federal Income, Estate and
Gift Taxes," 22 TAXES 6 ( I 944) ; Harriss, "The Case for Integrating the Estate and
Gift Taxes," PRoc. NAT. TAX AssN. 448 (1941); Warren, "Correlation of Gift and
Estate Taxes," 55 HARv. L. REv. I (1941).
872

1 947

J

FEDERAL TAXATION,

1941-1947

by the Supreme Court to reduce the burden of tax litigation in the
federal courts. Enlargement of the "question of fact" category was
seized upon as the device for attaching finality to determinations seen
to lie within the Tax Court's expert technical competence. Apart from
the uncertainty in the application of the Dobson doctrine and apart
from the question whether this development distorts the system of
judicial review contemplated by the statute, the question may well be
raised as a matter of policy whether the Dobson case points in the right
direction in a program of bringing greater order into federal tax administration. In his "iconoclastic observations" on the subject, Mr.
Eisenstein takes the position that the preferred solution to the problem is to accord greater weight and conclusiveness to the commissioner's regulations.876 Randolph Paul's thinking runs in the same direction.376 Dean Griswold urges the.creation of a court of tax appeals
to replace the present appellate review by the circuit courts of appeals
as the means of securing an expert and uniform interpretation of the
tax law.877 Whatever the best solution may be, it is clear that the problem of tax administration is one that calls for careful consideration.
Finally, the advent of the post-war era forces upon us the necessity
of rethinking our basic conceptions of tax policy and objectives, of appraising realistically the impact of taxation upon the nation's whole
economic structure and process, and of looking upon the taxing power
not simply as a source of necessary revenues but also as a means of
promoting national prosperity and well-being.878 On this point we are
well reminded by Randolph Paul:
"Taxes are no exception to the general rule that we live intelligently only by looking ahead to the long-range results of
what we presently do. A piecemeal, tinkering method of tax revision can yiel4 only jumbled results. There is a peculiar need in
376 "Some Iconoclastic Reflections on Tax Administration," 58 HARV. L. REv.
477 (1945).
876 PAUL, TAXATION FOR PROSPERITY 393-400 (1947).
877 "The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals," 57 HARV. L. REv. II53 (1944).
See also PAUL, TAXATION FOR PROSPERITY 400-404 (1947). Cf. Goldring, "Integration of the Tax Court into the Federal Judicial System," 25 TAXES 445 (1947).
378 See MAGILL, THE ,IMPACT OF FEDERAL TAXES (1943) and PAUL, TAXATION
FOR PROSPERITY (1947); also the references cited in note 368, supra.
On June 10, 1947, Chairman Knutson of the House Ways and Means Committee announced the appointment of a special Tax Study Committee to counsel with the
Ways and Means Committee on a complete revision of the Internal Revenue Code.
Mr. Roswell Magill was named chairman of the special committee. For the text of
the press release, see 5 P-H FED. TAX SERv., § 76, 190 (1947).
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taxation for seasoned judgment and mature perspective which can
appraise all changes in the light of a complete pattern of Federal
taxation. No less comprehensive approach will suffice, for taxes
at the rates necessary to meet present-day government expenditures must have a profound effect upon our daily lives. To impose them only for immeqiate revenue without consideration for
what they will do to our economy and without regard for their
social consequences would be the most costly mist~ke we could
make at this critical period of American history." 879
879

TAXATION FOR PROSPERITY

417-418 (1947).

